Agent of Z.O.G.
kiwifarms.net
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- 22 de Abr, 2016
With the random posts on xitter about how Iran is behind it, I really wish I remembered which Jace Connors vid had him mention Los Jihados Banditos
Mexican Drug War - Drugs, Violence and Narcocorridos
- Iniciador del tema Breadbassket
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🇵🇦 Nuestro primer dominio localizado está en español en kiwifarms.pa. Our first localized domain is on Spanish on kiwifarms.pa.
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- 8 de Jul, 2020
The ability to call up a couple dozen somewhat-organized shooters, piled into home-armored SUVs, is terrifying for civilians, the lone police patrols they encounter, and lesser-organized rival gangs. But it's not at all the equivalent of fielding a trained military, with dedicated supply lines, and endless resources.
Sure you have small numbers of commandos with military training, but the foot soldiers are just gang members there for a paycheck. They're not painting their faces and living in Vietnamese jungle tunnels. If a convoy of APCs with helicopters overhead shows up, they're either going to hear it coming and scatter (and lose whatever equipment/cash they have at that compound), or stick around and die.
To me the question is how many opportunistic ambushes/slaughters the cartel is allowed to pull off against under-resourced local authorities, before the FedGov decides to hit them with military resources.
- Registrado
- 19 de Jul, 2020
Depends on where they're happening and who's pockets the Cartel is filling. Corruption is rife, and all but the most diehard people don't have a hard time deciding between "some level of cooperation in return for dirty money" or "Assassinated and replaced with a more cooperative official". Even if the Cartel only gets early warnings about major actions out, that lets them flee those compounds in a more organized manner, or set up an ambush if they feel the need to prove a point like now. The cartels can't kill everyone, but they've collectively got enough people worried about it that enough info comes out that its really hard to pin them down, and the exceptionally corrupt ones are actively helping them, small a fraction as that might be. Army units taking bribes to look the other way, officers collectively understanding "don't look in that warehouse" and officials publicly talking about their plan to strike back while letting the cartel know exactly which safehouse will be hit and when, days in advance, so they can put out a bit of red meat to keep the wheels turning.
The federal level isn't immune to this, the assets they're deploying are ultimately local to someone, and its all getting communicated through likely compromised chains. Once this kind of corruption is rooted in, its extremely difficult to rip out.
The biggest threat to the Cartel right now is probably getting turned over by government forces when one of their own members higher up, taking advantage of the power vacuum, uses that same corruption to direct raids against rivals or conceals warnings about already intended ones, topple people opposing a power grab. Criminal organizations don't tend to respect lines of succession, especially when the guy who wrote it is now dead.
- Registrado
- 22 de Nov, 2021
- Registrado
- 7 de Ago, 2024
I swear, Mexico needs a dictator.
- Registrado
- 8 de Jul, 2020
Those fleets of trucks they show off on social media have to park somewhere, and finding out a military caravan is coming down the road with helicopters overhead might let you escape, but I doubt it lets you reposition all your gear. Especially if America is helping out with satellite surveillance.
Agree to an extent, but it cuts both ways. I don't think the majority of their help comes from embedded sociopathic agents, it's officials willing to turn a blind eye as long as business is good and the chaos stays away from touristy/civilian areas.
I have to believe that once it moves from cartel vs. cartel killings in the countryside, to airport being shot up and citizens from a couple dozen rich nations being terrified, that some of that passive help goes away, locals start informing, etc.
- Registrado
- 19 de Jun, 2024
Best living leader.
- Registrado
- 19 de Jul, 2020
Double edged sword. For the ones being corrupt for the money, the cartel going open season means your on the list too if you start withholding. For the ones doing it just to be left alone/not killed, the cartels going open season means that when they say "If we even suspect you've lied or withheld, we'll kill you", you fucking believe them because you're looking at the bodies right now. Its not like they're going to believe you if you've told them about prior raids then suddenly 'miss' a movement at an important time to them.
Satellites and foreign intelligence agencies aren't a magic catch-all, analyst hours are limited and they rely on cooperation with local forces to know where and what to be looking for. That's where the corruption gets difficult to discern. Someone on the roll lets it be known that there's suspicion of a compound in [region], so surveillance assets are tasked, analysts start pouring over things, couple weeks later, you've confirmed a compound with American help. Go in, raid, kill some narco's, seems like it all went well. 'cept the source of the ground intel was a rival cartel and you just cleared up some opposition to their most recent expansion. Meanwhile, that person who was on the roll was ignoring other info pointing back to potential sites from the cartel paying him, and brushing it off to his higher ups as "well I told the americans and they're focused on this one first". Its possible to disentangle some of this, but its hard to even identify it, resolving it requires multiple levels of organizational politics and conflict, and involves bringing other powerful organizations into question.
A lot of people envision these thing as coherent organizations, with corrupt pieces in them. The reality of the situation is that its thousands of people attempting to work together who may or may not be working to the same goal at any one time, and who may or may not be manipulated by outside forces at any one time. Identifying the difference between corruption, incompetence, differing priorities, and malicious organizational politics is a lifelong job all on its own, and in places like Mexico, those trying to do that identification are often on the take themselves. That's why I say corruption of this level is so hard to destroy, both because the investigators are often not clean, but because there's so much of it, it becomes impossible to tell if they're picking targets based on manipulated priorities or not.
- Registrado
- 8 de Jul, 2020
I was thinking less of the ones actively working with them, and more of the politicians and business leaders turning a blind eye as long as it didn't encroach on there areas. Same deal with random civilians who used to just look the other way...start screwing up people's lives and maybe they call in a tip.
Fair enough, I just find it hard to imagine you can keep the kind of gear they have under wraps. It's not a few rifles buried in the backyard, it's stuff that needs dedicated facilities, maintenance, refueling, etc. If the national government gets serious about going after them, it would seem like leaks might let henchman escape the compound, but not relocate the whole thing.
Hallucinogenic Penguin
kiwifarms.net
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- 21 de Mar, 2022
You’d need 1000 Bukeles to turn Mexico around.
- Registrado
- 19 de Jul, 2020
It looks worse than it is, its just civilian trucks with 'armor' steel plate welded on. Any motorhead with a welder and disregard for the lifespan of the rest of the vehicle could do the same, and it'd just need a normal garage. Most of the cartels assets are decentralized, they're not keeping a fleet of these vehicles in one place, its random 3 stall garages across city outskirts where one stalls been partitioned off "as storage" or some random back alley garage and there's a cartel armored truck in there. If they need them somewhere else, drive them out at night along the backroads, probably won't get noticed by anyone brave enough to call it in.
The cartels general lack of coordination works in their favor here, someone knows that they have vaguely four of them around a city, but they're in possession of some of their subordinates and they don't really know or care exactly where they are, so long as they can muster them up when needed. If one does get busted while moving, that sucks, but sheet steel and old trucks aren't hard to find, aren't suspicious to buy, so nobody really notices.
They're an intimidation tool at the end of the day. They suck to drive, get stuck if you try and offroad them, have a pretty short lifespan, and I wouldn't exactly rely on the armor to protect against anything that isn't a hollow point. Great for scaring the shit out of rural folks and discouraging rivals, but there's a reason everyone else who actually uses technicals to fight didn't adopt the fully uparmored approach.
- Registrado
- 22 de Nov, 2021
- Registrado
- 7 de Ago, 2024
Unfortunately seems to be the case.
- Registrado
- 8 de Jul, 2020
I get that, effective when ten of them ambush a rival gang or solo police patrol, useless against an actual military unit.
They like to show off caravans of dozens in tiktok propaganda, but if they have to sneak them around at night in ones and twos, that seems pretty useless. They can't both be a Serious Paramilitary Force that holds territory, and unable to gather in one place for longer than a photo shoot.
Honka Honka Burning Love
In Clown World, the only god is the one who Honks.
True & Honest Fan
kiwifarms.net
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- 29 de Ago, 2019
Needed it a couple hundred years ago when we had already buck broken them.
not Annexing Mexico and letting Texas buck break the spics into subservience in the Mexican American war was a mistake.
- Registrado
- 7 de Ago, 2024
I mean, they did have one at one point.
His name was Porfiro Diaz, unfortunately because some tards like Pancho Villa and other rebel groups decided that he needed to be overthrown and now Mexico has become an unstabilized mess.
They need another Porfiro Diaz.
Money Wizard
kiwifarms.net
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- 6 de Nov, 2024
El 3 has been selected as new leader of CJNG
(Archive)
On the morning of February 22nd, Mexican special forces killed Nemesio Rubén Oseguera Cervantes, El Mencho, in the mountain town of Tapalpa, Jalisco, ending an over decade long manhunt for the most powerful and elusive drug lord in Mexico.
The official account is straightforward: an army helicopter dropped more than a dozen special forces near his hideout before sunrise, a firefight erupted, and Mencho was found gravely wounded in the underbrush where he had fled with only two bodyguards. He died during the air transfer to a hospital in Mexico City. The official account says Mencho died of his wounds during the air transfer to Mexico City. But veteran cartel journalist Ioan Grillo, writing for his outlet CrashOut, reports that multiple Mexican and U.S. security sources told him the decision had been made before boots ever hit the ground: Mencho was not to be taken alive.
When soldiers pulled him wounded from the underbrush and loaded him onto a military plane, two of his operatives also reportedly died in transit. Three people dying of wounds on the same military aircraft is a hard thing to swallow, and Grillo doesn't shy away from what that implies. Whether Mencho was executed on that plane will likely never be officially confirmed.
But as Grillo points out, given the thousands CJNG has killed and the mass graves it has left across Mexico, the line of people demanding answers is going to be pretty short.
According to the Los Angeles Times, the circumstances that made the operation possible tell their own story. Mencho had hosted a party at the property the night before the raid. A romantic partner who was being tracked had left that morning. Authorities reportedly had only a few hours to plan once the location was confirmed. When the helicopters arrived, Mencho had roughly a dozen bodyguards with him, a fraction of his normal security apparatus, and was accompanied by just two when soldiers finally found him hiding in the underbrush.
The cabins where he spent his final hours had previously been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury for ties to CJNG. Staying at a location already on Washington's radar would seem like an obvious risk. Yet for a man who reportedly moved every two days, there may have been a certain logic to it. A property already scrutinized and passed over can start to feel, however foolishly, like one hiding in plain sight.
Striking at precisely this moment made every bit of sense. Mencho without his normal security apparatus was almost certainly a rare occurrence and with the Trump administration bearing down on Mexico with demands for tangible results against the cartels, the window was not one the Mexican government could afford to leave open. There are several rumors that other high-ranking members of the Cartel were killed, with the exception of El Tuli, these are unconfirmed at this point.
To understand what has been lost, and what has been unleashed, it helps to understand what Mencho represented. He was the most consequential figure in Mexican organized crime in the last decade, transforming CJNG from a regional outfit into a national force that has a presence in nearly every state. He demonstrated his capacity for survival, and for audacity, as far back as 2015, when CJNG shot down a Mexican military helicopter during an attempted capture of Mencho in Jalisco, an act of open warfare against the state that announced the cartel's arrival on the national stage in terms no one could ignore.
But the scale of Mencho's rise should never be separated from the scale of the suffering it produced. CJNG's expansion across Mexico left a trail of mass graves, displaced communities, and destroyed local economies in its wake. The cartel became one of the primary suppliers of fentanyl to the United States, a drug that has killed hundreds of thousands of Americans. Its territorial battles, fought with military-grade weapons, drones carrying explosives, and a deliberate strategy of spectacular brutality, gutted whole regions and drove entire populations from their homes. Journalists, police, local officials, and ordinary civilians paid with their lives for existing in spaces CJNG wanted to control.
The response to his death was immediate and fierce. Cartel operatives launched coordinated roadblocks and set fire to vehicles across Mexico. Whether this began as a frantic attempt to force the government to hand over Mencho, a last desperate bid to reverse the irreversible, or whether it was ]retaliatory once his death was confirmed, or some volatile mixture of both, remains an open question. What it demonstrated, unambiguously, is that CJNG retains the capacity to destabilize the country without its founder.
And the question of who leads that organization now has been answered. Multiple sources, including several contacted directly by this writer, point to Juan Carlos Valencia González, known as El 3, as the new leader of CJNG. El 3 is Mencho's stepson and the son of Armando Valencia Cornelio, the former kingpin of the Valencia cartel, giving him a bloodline that runs through two of the most powerful criminal organizations in modern Mexican history. His emergence as successor is not a surprise. El 3 has been considered a serious contender for succession since at least 2019 and has long operated within CJNG at the highest levels. One detail about El 3 stands apart from everything else. He was born in the United States, making him, if these sources are correct, the first American citizen ever to lead a major Mexican cartel.
Sources acknowledge, however, that there is a distinct uneasiness across the organization. CJNG is not a unified chain of command but a patchwork of semi-autonomous cells spread across the country, and several powerful lieutenants are now expected to bend the knee to a new leader. That deference may hold in the short term. Whether it holds beyond that is a different question entirely. The prospect of the organization fracturing is not a cause for optimism. A weakened but unified CJNG is the devil we know. A splintering CJNG, with powerful regional lieutenants suddenly freed from central authority and competing for dominance, is something far more dangerous and far harder to manage.
The official account is straightforward: an army helicopter dropped more than a dozen special forces near his hideout before sunrise, a firefight erupted, and Mencho was found gravely wounded in the underbrush where he had fled with only two bodyguards. He died during the air transfer to a hospital in Mexico City. The official account says Mencho died of his wounds during the air transfer to Mexico City. But veteran cartel journalist Ioan Grillo, writing for his outlet CrashOut, reports that multiple Mexican and U.S. security sources told him the decision had been made before boots ever hit the ground: Mencho was not to be taken alive.
When soldiers pulled him wounded from the underbrush and loaded him onto a military plane, two of his operatives also reportedly died in transit. Three people dying of wounds on the same military aircraft is a hard thing to swallow, and Grillo doesn't shy away from what that implies. Whether Mencho was executed on that plane will likely never be officially confirmed.
But as Grillo points out, given the thousands CJNG has killed and the mass graves it has left across Mexico, the line of people demanding answers is going to be pretty short.
According to the Los Angeles Times, the circumstances that made the operation possible tell their own story. Mencho had hosted a party at the property the night before the raid. A romantic partner who was being tracked had left that morning. Authorities reportedly had only a few hours to plan once the location was confirmed. When the helicopters arrived, Mencho had roughly a dozen bodyguards with him, a fraction of his normal security apparatus, and was accompanied by just two when soldiers finally found him hiding in the underbrush.
The cabins where he spent his final hours had previously been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury for ties to CJNG. Staying at a location already on Washington's radar would seem like an obvious risk. Yet for a man who reportedly moved every two days, there may have been a certain logic to it. A property already scrutinized and passed over can start to feel, however foolishly, like one hiding in plain sight.
Striking at precisely this moment made every bit of sense. Mencho without his normal security apparatus was almost certainly a rare occurrence and with the Trump administration bearing down on Mexico with demands for tangible results against the cartels, the window was not one the Mexican government could afford to leave open. There are several rumors that other high-ranking members of the Cartel were killed, with the exception of El Tuli, these are unconfirmed at this point.
To understand what has been lost, and what has been unleashed, it helps to understand what Mencho represented. He was the most consequential figure in Mexican organized crime in the last decade, transforming CJNG from a regional outfit into a national force that has a presence in nearly every state. He demonstrated his capacity for survival, and for audacity, as far back as 2015, when CJNG shot down a Mexican military helicopter during an attempted capture of Mencho in Jalisco, an act of open warfare against the state that announced the cartel's arrival on the national stage in terms no one could ignore.
But the scale of Mencho's rise should never be separated from the scale of the suffering it produced. CJNG's expansion across Mexico left a trail of mass graves, displaced communities, and destroyed local economies in its wake. The cartel became one of the primary suppliers of fentanyl to the United States, a drug that has killed hundreds of thousands of Americans. Its territorial battles, fought with military-grade weapons, drones carrying explosives, and a deliberate strategy of spectacular brutality, gutted whole regions and drove entire populations from their homes. Journalists, police, local officials, and ordinary civilians paid with their lives for existing in spaces CJNG wanted to control.
The response to his death was immediate and fierce. Cartel operatives launched coordinated roadblocks and set fire to vehicles across Mexico. Whether this began as a frantic attempt to force the government to hand over Mencho, a last desperate bid to reverse the irreversible, or whether it was ]retaliatory once his death was confirmed, or some volatile mixture of both, remains an open question. What it demonstrated, unambiguously, is that CJNG retains the capacity to destabilize the country without its founder.
And the question of who leads that organization now has been answered. Multiple sources, including several contacted directly by this writer, point to Juan Carlos Valencia González, known as El 3, as the new leader of CJNG. El 3 is Mencho's stepson and the son of Armando Valencia Cornelio, the former kingpin of the Valencia cartel, giving him a bloodline that runs through two of the most powerful criminal organizations in modern Mexican history. His emergence as successor is not a surprise. El 3 has been considered a serious contender for succession since at least 2019 and has long operated within CJNG at the highest levels. One detail about El 3 stands apart from everything else. He was born in the United States, making him, if these sources are correct, the first American citizen ever to lead a major Mexican cartel.
Sources acknowledge, however, that there is a distinct uneasiness across the organization. CJNG is not a unified chain of command but a patchwork of semi-autonomous cells spread across the country, and several powerful lieutenants are now expected to bend the knee to a new leader. That deference may hold in the short term. Whether it holds beyond that is a different question entirely. The prospect of the organization fracturing is not a cause for optimism. A weakened but unified CJNG is the devil we know. A splintering CJNG, with powerful regional lieutenants suddenly freed from central authority and competing for dominance, is something far more dangerous and far harder to manage.