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Greer v. Moon, No. 20-cv-00647 (D. Utah Sep. 16, 2020)
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Greer v. Moon
2:20-cv-00647— District Court, D. Utah
Docket No.
2:20-cv-00647
Court
District Court, D. Utah
Filed
15 de Sep, 2020
Terminated
22 de Abr, 2024
Nature of Suit
820 Copyright
Cause
17:0501 Copyright Infringement
Jurisdiction
Federal Question
Jury Demand
None
Last Filing
6 de Ago, 2024
Parties (4)
Parties
Lolcow, LLC, Kiwi Farms, Joshua Moon, Russell G. Greer
Recent Filings
(showing 5 of 127)
#
Date
Description
Filing
—
6 de Ago, 2024
Case no longer referred to Magistrate Judge Jared C. Bennett. (kpf)
113
15 de Mayo, 2024
ORDER of USCA Supreme Court Circuit as to 45 Notice of Appeal, filed by Russell G. Greer. Supreme Court order dated 05/13/2024 denying certiorari. (jrj) (Entered: 05/16/2024)
112
28 de Abr, 2024
NOTICE OF TRANSMITTAL that case has been transferred to Northern District of Floridia via electronic given case number 3:24-cv-00122-MCR-ZCB. (nl) (Entered: 04/29/2024)
111
25 de Abr, 2024
Report on the Final Decision of an action mailed to the Register of Copyrights Office. (kpf) (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/26/2024: # 1 Copy Right Form) (kpf). (Entered: 04/26/2024)
NOTICE OF TRANSMITTAL that case has been transferred to Northern District of Florida. (kpf) (Entered: 04/26/2024)
GREER v. MOON
3:24-cv-00122— District Court, N.D. Florida
Docket No.
3:24-cv-00122
Court
District Court, N.D. Florida
Filed
19 de Mar, 2024
Terminated
10 de Jun, 2024
Nature of Suit
820 Copyright
Cause
17:501 Copyright Infringement
Jurisdiction
Federal Question
Jury Demand
None
Last Filing
16 de Oct, 2024
Parties (4)
Parties
LOLCOW LLC, RUSSELL G GREER, KIWI FARMS, JOSHUA MOON
Recent Filings
(showing 5 of 155)
#
Date
Description
Filing
—
16 de Oct, 2024
ACTION REQUIRED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE: Chambers of MAGISTRATE JUDGE ZACHARY C BOLITHO notified that action is needed Re: 132 Mail Returned. (mah)
132
15 de Oct, 2024
Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Mail sent to Russell G. Greer re: 128 ORDER. Order mailed to 1155 S. Twain Avenue, Suite 108420, Las Vegas, NV 89169. (Attachment: #1 Notice of Returned Mail). (mah) (Entered: 10/17/2024)
AO 121 Copyright Case Notification of order entered. Copy sent to the Register of Copyrights. U.S. Copyright Office, 101 Independence Ave. S.E., Washington, D.C. 20559-6000. (adf) (Entered: 07/11/2024)
ACKNOWLEDGMENT re 129 Case Transferred Out to Another District. Case transferred from Florida Northern has been opened in District of Utah as case 2:24cv00421, filed 06/11/2024. (jfj) (Entered: 06/13/2024)
Interdistrict Transfer to the District of Utah. (jfj) (Entered: 06/11/2024)
Greer v. Moon
2:24-cv-00421— District Court, D. Utah
Docket No.
2:24-cv-00421
Court
District Court, D. Utah
Filed
10 de Jun, 2024
Nature of Suit
820 Copyright
Cause
17:0501 Copyright Infringement
Jurisdiction
Federal Question
Jury Demand
Plaintiff
Last Filing
21 de Jun, 2026
Parties (4)
Parties
Lolcow LLC, Kiwi Farms, Joshua Moon, Russell G. Greer
Recent Filings
(showing 5 of 525)
#
Date
Description
Filing
486
21 de Jun, 2026
Defendant's REPLY to Response to Motion re [480] Defendant's MOTION to Unseal Document [1] filed by Russell G. Greer and Memorandum in Support filed by Defendants Lolcow LLC, Joshua Moon, Counter Claimants Lolcow LLC, Joshua Moon. (Attachments: (1) Exhibit A (publicly-filed Tennessee in forma pauperis application), (2) Exhibit B (publicly-filed Tennessee order denying in forma pauperis status), (3) Exhibit C (publicly-filed Nevada in forma pauperis applications))(Hardin, Matthew)
Defendant's REPLY to Response to Motion re [478] Defendant's MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings and Memorandum in Support as to both claims and counterclaims filed by Defendants Lolcow LLC, Joshua Moon, Counter Claimants Lolcow LLC, Joshua Moon. (Hardin, Matthew)
Defendant's REPLY to Response to Motion re [477] Defendant's MOTION to Amend Judgment and Memorandum in Support (Motion to Reconsider)Defendant's MOTION to Vacate [449] Modification of Docket, [453] Order on Report and Recommendations, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion to Dismiss Case as Frivolous, Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, Order on Mo filed by Defendants Lolcow LLC, Joshua Moon. (Attachments: (1) Exhibit A (Mr. Greer did not timely file because he "fell asleep"))(Hardin, Matthew)
RESPONSE to Motion re [477] Defendant's MOTION to Amend Judgment and Memorandum in Support (Motion to Reconsider)Defendant's MOTION to Vacate [449] Modification of Docket, [453] Order on Report and Recommendations, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion to Dismiss Case as Frivolous, Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, Order on Mo filed by Plaintiff Russell G. Greer. (jrj)
RESPONSE to Motion re [480] Defendant's MOTION to Unseal Document [1] filed by Russell G. Greer and Memorandum in Support filed by Plaintiff Russell G. Greer. (jrj)
Greer v. Moon
21-4128— Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Docket No.
21-4128
Court
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Filed
26 de Oct, 2021
Terminated
15 de Oct, 2023
Nature of Suit
3820 Copyright
Last Filing
4 de Jun, 2026
Recent Filings
#
Date
Description
Filing
10010756599
19 de Oct, 2022
[10949330] Appellant's reply brief filed by Russell G. Greer. Served on 10/20/2022. Manner of Service: email. Word/page count: 6487. This pleading complies with all required privacy and virus certifications: Yes. [21-4128] [Entered: 10/21/2022 07:58 AM]
NOW COME the Defendants, and file this Reply in further support of their Motion
at ECF No. 477. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider, ECF No. 481, should
be disregarded for a simple reason: it was filed late, without an extension, and without
good cause. Mr. Greer’s only explanation (which was sent to counsel, and never filed with
the Court) is that he “fell asleep.” Exhibit A. That is not a basis to excuse an untimely
filing, and the Court may decide the Motion as unopposed. In any event, Mr. Greer’s
opposition does not meet the Motion even considered on its merits. Instead, Mr. Greer
attacks an argument Defendants did not make (that this Court should “overrule” the Tenth
1
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Circuit), while ignoring the argument Defendants did make (that two intervening,
unanimous decisions of the United States Supreme Court have changed the law that
controls Plaintiff’s claims). On that critical question, Mr. Greer offers no answer. I. The opposition was untimely and should be disregarded.
Defendants filed their Motion to Reconsider on June 4, 2026. ECF No. 477. The
Motion is brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b); it is not a motion under
Rule 12(b), Rule 12(c), or Rule 56. The twenty-eight-day response period of DUCivR 7-
1(a)(4)(D)(i), which applies only to oppositions to those dispositive motions, therefore
does not apply. The governing period is the fourteen days allowed by DUCivR 7-
1(a)(4)(D)(ii). Plaintiff’s opposition was due on June 18, 2026. He did not file it until June
19, 2026. ECF No. 481. It was untimely on its face.
Mr. Greer never moved for an extension. Once a deadline has passed, the Court
may extend it only “on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act
because of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). Mr. Greer filed no such motion,
and any hypothetical motion would fail even if it were filed. Mr. Greer’s sole explanation,
given in the email transmitting the filing, is that he did not send it earlier because he “fell
asleep.” Exhibit A. Falling asleep is the ordinary carelessness that the excusable-neglect
standard does not excuse; it reflects nothing outside Mr. Greer’s control and no reason
he could not have filed on time. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd.
P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 388, 395 (1993) (excusable neglect is an equitable determination
that turns on, among other things, the reason for the delay and whether it was within the
movant’s reasonable control).
2
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Mr. Greer is not a litigant unfamiliar with the Court’s deadlines or unable to meet
them, nor has Mr. Greer been shy about filing motions claiming “excusable neglect” in the
past. Instead, Mr. Greer is a litigant who meets deadlines when he chooses to and
disregards them when he does not. Having neither sought an extension nor offered any
adequate reason for the delay, Mr. Greer cannot have his late opposition considered as
of right. The Court is well within its discretion to disregard ECF No. 481 and to decide the
Motion to Reconsider as unopposed. See DUCivR 7-1. II. Even if considered, Mr. Greer’s opposition confirms that the Motion for
Reconsideration should be granted.
Mr. Greer spends most of his opposition attacking an argument Defendants never
made: that this Court should “overrule” the Tenth Circuit. ECF No. 481, at 1–3.
Defendants asked the Court to do something different and routine: to revisit an
interlocutory order in light of “an intervening change in the controlling law.” Servants of
the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). That
change is two unanimous, post-judgment decisions of the Supreme Court, Cox
Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, 607 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 959 (2026),
and Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc., 608 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct.
1391 (2026). Applying a later decision of the Supreme Court is not declaring the Tenth
Circuit wrong; it is following the higher court, which the Tenth Circuit is itself bound to do.1
1 Unsurprisingly, Mr. Greer does not address the argument that an intervening change
in controlling law is an exception to the usual confines of the Mandate Rule. Huffman v.
Saul Holdings, Ltd. P'ship, 262 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 2001). This Court cannot be
bound by the Tenth Circuit’s opinion where the intervening decisions of the Supreme
Court have eviscerated the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning.
3
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When an intervening Supreme Court decision is irreconcilable with prior circuit precedent,
the precedent no longer controls. Mr. Greer’s position would freeze this case under
superseded law until the court of appeals revisits it, which is not how intervening Supreme
Court authority works. What’s more, Mr. Greer’s own opposition confirms both that the
controlling standard has changed and that his claim cannot survive it. A. Lolcow is a service provider, and Cox governs this case directly.
Mr. Greer’s lead distinction, that Cox involved an “internet service provider” while
Kiwi Farms did not, fails twice over. First, Cox announced no rule for broadband providers
alone. Its holding speaks to “the provider of a service,” and the Supreme Court grounded
it in Sony, which involved the maker of a product, the Betamax recorder, and in Grokster,
which involved software, neither of them an internet service provider. Cox Commc'ns,
Inc., 146 S. Ct. 959, 967 (2026). That contributory liability requires inducement or a
service tailored to infringement is a statement of the elements of the claim, not a carve-
out for broadband companies.
Second, it is both factually indisputable and part of the law of this case that Lolcow
is a service provider. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act defines a “service provider”
broadly as “a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities
therefor...” 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B). Kiwi Farms, a website that stores and displays
material its users upload, is such a provider. Indeed, the entirety of Mr. Greer’s claim
depends on Kiwi Farms being a service provider: the notice-and-takedown process the
Plaintiff invoked exists only as to service providers, see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), and the Tenth
Circuit analyzed his claim through that very framework. Greer, 83 F.4th at 1286
(discussing the § 512(c) notice-and-takedown process). The original district court judge
4
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was explicit on the point when she dismissed Mr. Greer’s speech-tort claims, holding that
“Kiwi Farms qualifies as an interactive computer service” and that “[t]he prototypical
service qualifying for [Section 230] immunity is an online messaging board (or bulletin
board) ... Kiwi Farms fits the bill.” Greer v. Moon, No. 2:20-cv-00647, ECF No. 37, at 6–7
(D. Utah Sept. 21, 2021), citing FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1195 (10th Cir.
2009). Far from seeking to reverse that portion of the District Court’s opinion, Mr. Greer
relied upon the premise that Kiwi Farms is a service provider when this case was on
appeal, and encouraged the Tenth Circuit to analyze liability under a theory in which
DMCA notices applicable only to service providers gave rise to liability.
Mr. Greer cannot invoke the DMCA’s service-provider machinery to build his claim
and, in the same breath, insist that Lolcow is not a service provider in order to escape the
Supreme Court decision that governs service providers. B. Mr. Greer’s “harassment” and “hostile forum” themes seek to relitigate
claims that are long abandoned.
Much of Mr. Greer’s opposition is devoted to describing Kiwi Farms as a “targeted
harassment forum” and a “hostile mockery thread,” to casting it as a forum for abuse, and
to branding Mr. Moon a “public nuisance.” ECF No. 481, at 2–4. None of that states a
claim in this case. The original court dismissed Mr. Greer’s electronic-communications-
harassment claim with prejudice because the statute affords no private right of action,
and it dismissed his false-light and defamation claims with prejudice as barred by Section
230 of the Communications Decency Act. Greer v. Moon, No. 2:20-cv-00647, ECF No.
37, at 5–8 (D. Utah Sept. 21, 2021). At Mr. Greer’s own urging, the Tenth Circuit revived
only a single claim: contributory copyright infringement. The question Cox and Hikma
5
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pose is whether Lolcow took affirmative steps to induce the copyright infringement, not
whether its forum is unpleasant or its users abusive. Mr. Greer’s harassment narrative is
legally irrelevant to that question, and to the extent he offers it to manufacture
“encouragement,” he is attempting to relitigate claims the Tenth Circuit did not revive and
that Section 230 independently bars. C. Mr. Greer’s opposition concedes the Plaintiff’s theory is a failure to act,
which Cox holds is insufficient.
Stripped of its rhetoric, Mr. Greer’s opposition describes the very conduct the
Supreme Court has now placed outside contributory liability. Mr. Greer says he is suing
“because Moon received Plaintiff’s takedown notice; because Moon refused removal; ...
and because Moon continued to allow the exploitation of Plaintiff’s copyrighted works.”
ECF No. 481 at 3; see also id. at 1–2 (faulting Moon for “refusing to remove Plaintiff’s
copyrighted works”). That is knowledge of infringement plus a refusal to remove, which is
simply another way to say “a failure to act.” The original district court characterized Mr.
Greer’s theory in precisely those terms when it dismissed the claim, holding that a
defendant who has “merely ‘permitted’ the infringing material to remain on the website,
without having ‘induc[ed] or encourag[ed]’ the initial infringement,” is not contributorily
liable. Greer v. Moon, No. 2:20-cv-00647, ECF No. 37, at 5 (D. Utah Sept. 21, 2021)
(citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930). The original District Court Judge has now been entirely
vindicated, as her view is virtually identical to the view that the Supreme Court has
endorsed and the Tenth Circuit’s contrary opinion is impossible to reconcile with recent
binding and unanimous Supreme Court jurisprudence
6
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of 8 Cox now holds exactly as Judge Tena Campbell did five years ago: Contributory
liability requires that the provider “induced the infringement or the provided service is
tailored to that infringement,” and “mere knowledge that a service will be used to infringe
is insufficient.” Cox Commc'ns, Inc., 146 S. Ct. at 968. The claim “cannot rest only on a
provider’s knowledge of infringement and insufficient action to prevent it.” Id. at 969. The
one affirmative act Mr. Greer identifies, reposting the takedown notice, is not the kind of
“active steps . . . to encourage” infringement that Hikma requires, which means conduct
that is “affirmative,” not “passive,” and which forbids resting liability on “mere omissions,
inactions,” or on “speculation about how [others] may act.” Hikma Pharm. USA Inc. v.
Amarin Pharma, Inc., 146 S. Ct. 1391 (2026), citing Takeda Pharm. U.S.A., Inc. v. W.-
Ward Pharm. Corp., 785 F.3d 625, 632 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Reposting a DMCA notice is neither promotion of infringement nor instruction to
infringe, and the inference that users infringed because of the repost is the very
speculation Hikma rejects. The Tenth Circuit’s contrary conclusion rested on the theory
that “the reposting of the takedown notice, combined with the refusal to take down the
infringing material, amounted to encouragement.” Greer, 83 F.4th 1283, 1295 (10th Cir.
2023). That is the theory Cox and Hikma have displaced. Because Mr. Greer rests his
claim on knowledge and a refusal to act, his opposition does not rebut the Motion; it
confirms it. CONCLUSION
Mr. Greer’s opposition was untimely and should be disregarded, and the Motion to
Reconsider should be granted as unopposed. In the alternative, and for the reasons
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stated in the Motion and above, the Court should reconsider its orders at ECF Nos. 448
and 453 and dismiss Counts I and II of the First Amended Complaint.
DATED June 22, 2026 HARDIN LAW OFFICE
/sneed/ Matthew D. Hardin Matthew D. Hardin Attorney for Defendants
Joshua Moon and Lolcow, LLC
ECF 484 and attachment 1 as Images and PDF attached.
Of course the professional tard wrangler is well aware of what the tard in question said. He literally referenced it in this case, in ECF 426, the same day Greer filed it:
On December 23, 2025, Mr. Greer filed a new lawsuit in Nevada. In that
lawsuit, Mr. Greer told the U.S. District Court that he ‘has training and experience as a
paralegal and is therefore familiar with legal research, drafting, and procedure.” ECF No.
426-1 at 11. Mr. Greer added that as a result of this training and knowledge, he is “fully
capable of representing himself.” Id. Defendants respectfully submit that Mr. Greer’s
self-professed knowledge of the law and of proper procedure when dealing with the U.S.
District Court in Nevada undermines Mr. Greer’s purported “sincere belief” defense in
this Court. It also shows that Mr. Greer’s legal violations here were willful in nature, and
makes sanctions more appropriate.
The insistence that every mundane little fact when citing case law to support an argument must be identical is extremely funny.
KF can't compare its case to Cox because it's not an ISP.
Similarly, Shitlips is never allowed to cite anything unless the party has his precise facial deformity.
Missing the deadline because "I fell asleep" is fucking sublime. He can't even deign to come up with a more respectable excuse because he knows Bowtie won't do shit.
Of course the professional tard wrangler is well aware of what the tard in question said. He literally referenced it in this case, in ECF 426, the same day Greer filed it:
And I believe his "neutral ISP" is a strawman argument. Net neutrality isn't in effect and ISPs are private companies that set their own content rules and TOS. Cox isn't neutral either.
Mr. Greer’s position would freeze this case under superseded law until the court of appeals revisits it, which is not how intervening Supreme Court authority works.
Well if your evil harassing client would just STOP fighting the lawsuit so hard, and stopped filing frivolous defenses of his rights, and frivolously requesting irrelevant documents that cost dozens of dollars to retrieve, then the suit would've been over by now! It's unjust that Plaintiff has to fight all these technical formatting rules and orders that don't say what he believes!
Plaintiff Plaintiff filed in good faith under the old law, and should get a good faith win because he sincerely believed he was right. SCOTUS should be ignored until after Plaintiff is awarded $300,000.
...He didn't. It was in his thread's OP (which was written by @Cryin RN, a user who has not logged on in over a year). Best as I can tell, that sentence (or anything close to it) hasn't been in the OP since about 2023.
I think that was in the allegedly infringing post that included the song as an attachement (from memory, as it no longer exists)- though it may have also been in the OP
Russell accuses Null and Hardin of "an end run around" the 10th circuit because Hardin used that exact phrase to describe Russell attempting to get a retraining order in Nevada against Hardin's conduct in this Utah case, while he admitted motions about it were pending in Utah, as "an end run around" the Utah judges. And monkey see monkey do is the extent of Russell's legal knowledge
TBF Russell says he only sent it "to you" (Hardin) because he fell asleep, not to the courts, so he'll try to argue that actually the opposition to the motion to reconsider was one of the 2 he sent "yesterday" on time, he just didn't send it to Hardin until Friday.
But of course, the court clerks will have their own records of when Russell sent which emails
...he said he fell asleep to insult Hardin in e-mailing hin late but also filed to the court late, meaning "I fell asleep" is his official reason for late filing and will be something he has to argue was excusable!?
IMAGINE THE PLUGHTSPERGING FOR WHY HE WAS SLEEPY! AND WHY IT ISN'T NEGLECT! I am excited.
Also good reply from Hardin. Very factual and straight to the point of Greer's double sided dealing in his entire case resting on Lolcow LLC being a service provider and not a service provider simultaneously.
Mr. Greer cannot invoke the DMCA’s service-provider machinery to build his claim and, in the same breath, insist that Lolcow is not a service provider in order to escape the Supreme Court decision that governs service providers.
TBF Russell says he only sent it "to you" (Hardin) because he fell asleep, not to the courts, so he'll try to argue that actually the opposition to the motion to reconsider was one of the 2 he sent "yesterday" on time, he just didn't send it to Hardin until Friday.
But of course, the court clerks will have their own records of when Russell sent which emails
As I pointed out upthread with a screenshot though, he explicitly did not file 481 until the 19th, the day after the deadline. He signed and dated the document June 19th, and certified in the same document that it was served on the 19th. It's late, full stop.
So stupid, so lazy, so entitled, that he files past the deadline despite having weeks to prepare, and then tries to give a flippant insult to the other side with the only on record excuse he's bothered giving: He overslept.
If this was a real court and not a clown show, bowties included, that would probably be sanctionable in and of itself, under the "did this motherfucker just..." rule of uncivil procedure.
Looks like Greer did submit a response after the court closed on Friday. This is just about Hardin's motion to reconsider though, nothing about opposing the IFP filing being unsealed yet.
481 reads as if Rusty has no idea how any of this works, full stop. It might as well be the random rantings of an unmedicated mental patient for as much sense and relevance it made and had.
This is a shot across the bow from Hardin if ever there was one. He is entirely correct but it is still wild as hell to actually come out and say it. I'm not sure I entirely understand why Hardin is being this direct.