On Oct. 3, 1993, Task Force Ranger headed to the center of Mogadishu, Somalia, to capture rebel leaders using a combination of air and land assets. Air operations used helicopters to insert troops and provide them with fire support as they executed the mission. The ground assault force was responsible for getting to the target location and capturing the rebel leaders. Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison led the operation.
It is important to mention that before the operation was launched, Garrison requested AC-130 gunships and Armor to provide support the ground troops, but because of the rules of engagement (ROE), he was denied these assets. This showed a lack of understanding and directly affected U.S. capacity to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy. Another point to consider is that U.S. Soldiers were overly confident. They believed SNA forces did not have the weapons or training to fight back. Also, both Soldiers and their leaders thought the SNA would not be ready for them and assumed the raid would be easy and successful. They underestimated the enemy.
Turning Point
The operation was initially successful, when they captured 24 prisoners; however, an unforeseen significant event changed the mission’s outcome. According to Sangvic (1998), “an MH-60 designated Super 61 was shot down at 1620 by an RPG and crashed about 300 yards from the target” (p.15). The fact that MH-60 helicopters are vulnerable to Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and small arms fire was a failure by leadership to assess the operating environment. That one RPG changed the course of the entire operation.
The ground assault force did not see where Super 61 crashed and asked for directions to the crash site. Garrison provided a P3 Orion spy plane to direct them but that came with its own set of obstacles. First, the SNA blocked and barricaded most of the streets and the Orion could not detect them. Second, according to Dotson (2016), “The problem was that the plane gave directions to the pair of forward observers who then relayed the information to the drivers on the ground” (p. 143). Because the information/intelligence first went through a third party (forward observers), it created an extra step and caused a real time delay.
The Second Crash Site
Approximately 20 minutes after Fadid’s forces shot down Super 61, when the ground assault force neared the location to secure the crash site, the SNA shot down another MH-60, Super 64, about half a mile from the ground assault force, which was still fighting its way to Super 61.
A large problem the convoy encountered while trying to find a direct route to Super 64 was recovering the casualties they encountered along the route. After 45 minutes, the convoy was loaded with so many casualties and wounded it had to turn around and drive back to the base (Sangvic, 1998).
Final Results
By the time the sun set over Somalia the next day, 18 Americans were dead and 73 were wounded. Chief Warrant Officer 3 Michael Durant, 160th Special Operations Group and one of Super 64’s pilots, was taken prisoner, and hundreds of Somali civilians were killed in what came to be known as the Battle of Mogadishu. (Longley, 2019, para. 2)
