What makes a moral rule actually binding? - Discuss the ethics of ethics

[daffodils]

They appeal to various facts about the world and then infer an obligation from them.

Your examples need additional premises to form valid arguments:

1. Human flourishing is good
2. (We ought to promote what is good)
3. Therefore, we ought to promote human flourishing

1. An action increases happiness
2. (Increasing happiness is good)
3. (We ought to do what is good)
4. Therefore, we ought to perform that action

1. Human life requires certain actions
2. (Human life is good)
3. (We ought to promote what is good)
4. Therefore, we ought to perform certain actions

The question in the thread is to zoom in on that step and examine what would make the transition from a fact to an obligation valid.

What makes it valid is the form of the argument. I guess you are asking if the premises are true.

"We ought to do what is good" is pretty much true by definition. Identifying a certain course of action as good or right is the result of an evaluation. A proper moral evaluation already takes other factors such as reasonable self-interest and prudence into account. It would be nonsensical to then turn around and ask, "But why should I do what I just decided I should do???"

"Happiness is good" and "human life is good" are at least very common intuitions. It would be strange to reject them. But even if you did, it wouldn't matter for this argument as long as you think that at least some things are good or bad.

 

[Gap Hag]

It is irrelevant to know what the ought is or what one's moral obligation is. Man used to not know what gravity was or how it worked but was still bound by it. Whether or not they ought to have jumped is irrelevant. The fall regardless. Whether one thinks they are acting morally or not is also irrelevant, because that choice to not act morally is itself an ought.

A great way of showing the moral law is, they may not care if they slight someone, but they will be upset if someone slights them in that same way.

 

[XL xQgg?QcQCaTYDMjqoDnYpG]

The only thing that truly has consequences in the eternal is religion, the only thing motivating you to not commit crimes in this world is whether or not you can get away with it if we believe morals are just social constructs. if we have a morality that permits anything as long as you get away with it then sure you can do that, but that doesn't mean it's correct. you are trying to divorce morality from religion but you can not, otherwise there's literally no reason why a tyrant is any worse from a humanitarian worker his perspective, they're both doing what they see as right.

We can't use historical examples?

The issue is you're running two arguments at once, and both miss the step that I'm targeting in the thread.
Like, no religion -> morality becomes social construct -> therefore morality requires religion
And separately, historical societies relied on religion -> therefore morality depends on religion
The former doesn't answer the grounding question, it only restates a consequence model (rule -> punishment (divine/social) -> comply or get away with it)
The latter explains why someone might obey the rue, but still leaves open the step authority -> ??? -> moral obligation
What actually turns a description of the world into a claim that (not) acting in a certain way is morally right/wrong?

---

The mere existence of the ought as an idea generates a moral obligation ontologically.

That is a move that needs justification.
The mere existence of an idea in human thought does not mean that it automatically becomes a feature of reality. Unicorns, for instance, exist as an idea, but the existence of unicorns as an idea does not generate real unicorns ontologically.
The step that still needs explanation is: idea of an ought -> property of reality that makes the idea true
And gravity doesn't help here, because gravity is not inferred from the idea of gravity. The idea of gravity is instead inferred from consistent physical behavior.
So what feature of reality makes the idea of an "ought" correspond to something real, rather than merely being another concept that people can imagine?

---

Your examples need additional premises to form valid arguments:

1. Human flourishing is good
2. (We ought to promote what is good)
3. Therefore, we ought to promote human flourishing

1. An action increases happiness
2. (Increasing happiness is good)
3. (We ought to do what is good)
4. Therefore, we ought to perform that action

1. Human life requires certain actions
2. (Human life is good)
3. (We ought to promote what is good)
4. Therefore, we ought to perform certain actions

These arguments define the obligation instead of explaining it.
All of those share the same structure: X is good -> we ought to do what is good -> therefore we ought to do X
It's exactly that second premise that the thread is about.

"We ought to do what is good" is pretty much true by definition.

Even if I were to grant this, it moves the obligation into the definition of "good". And that makes the argument circular.
we ought to do what is good
good = what we ought to do
therefore, we ought to do what we ought to do
Defining normativity and then treating that definition as if it were an explanation doesn't resolve the issue.
The question remains unchanged: What feature of reality makes something good in a way that generates a moral obligation to pursue it?

---

A great way of showing the moral law is, they may not care if they slight someone, but they will be upset if someone slights them in that same way.

That observation shows that people dislike being treated badly, but it does not show that harming others is morally wrong.
Someone could consistently say "I dislike being harmed, but I am willing to harm others if it benefits me". That position may be hypocritical, but it is not logically contradictory.
That is to say, the psychological reaction does not yet explain what would make the rule morally binding.

 

[Gap Hag]

What actually turns a description of the world into a claim that (not) acting in a certain way is morally right/wrong?

Well i think it's fair to say that if you can prove a source of morals to be true then that is ultimately the correct set of morals.
And on the moral law being hypocritical it still shows some sort of emotional reaction deep within i think that points to something more, even in a team of thieves, even if you expected to be robbed you'd still be upset.

 

[Friend of Dorothy Parker]

what actually makes a moral rule binding in the first place?

What is your own answer to this question? And you don't include the predecessor question of, "are moral rules binding?" Why?

As a side note, you are too quick to dismiss comments or perspectives as moral nihilism or relativism and don't reckon with them.

Your comments also tend to lump all levels of "morals" together in the same tier of importance; is that your view?

The alternative to objective, known, iron-ribbed universal truth(s) is not inherently the absence of any truth, and not every moral prescriptive is of the same criticality.

What is the import of an existential "binding" nature of specific morals?

 

[daffodils]

These arguments define the obligation instead of explaining it.

Major improvement over what was previously on offer, then.

Even if I were to grant this,

You absolutely should grant it, it has the benefit of being true.

What feature of reality makes something good in a way that generates a moral obligation to pursue it?

What kinds of things would you accept as features of reality?

 

[The Last Stand]

Pascal's wager.

Okay, don't drop terms without any explanation for the reader.

"We ought to do what is good" is pretty much true by definition.

I want to touch on that "ought" with a moral example. Some people or cultures believe that having children is morally "right" as to preserve one's bloodline or family name. Okay, now the "how" is where it gets interesting.

To have children, you'd need to procreate with somebody. Now, would the "ought" for human nature be to continue having children to preserve the human race? Now, what about people that just have sex for lust or without any forethought? That could be argued as "morally wrong," as they carelessly brought life into the world and do not take responsibility for it.

Or, even better, what if your family wants you to marry or procreate with a particular race to preserve that bloodline? You do not, now you're "morally wrong" in terms of culture or tradition, correct?

 

[XL xQgg?QcQCaTYDMjqoDnYpG]

Well i think it's fair to say that if you can prove a source of morals to be true then that is ultimately the correct set of morals.

Proving a source of morality would still leave the same step open.
For instance, suppose it were proven that human flourishing is a real feature of the world, that would establish a fact about reality. What still needs explanation is why that fact generates an obligation.
In other words, fact about reality -> ??? -> moral obligation

And on the moral law being hypocritical it still shows some sort of emotional reaction deep within i think that points to something more, even in a team of thieves, even if you expected to be robbed you'd still be upset.

Which shows something about human psychology. But it does not yet explain why harming someone would be morally wrong rather than simply something they don't like.

---

What is your own answer to this question? And you don't include the predecessor question of, "are moral rules binding?" Why?

The reason I asked what makes a moral rule binding rather whether there are any binding ones is because most moral language already treats certain claims that way.
For example, when people say "rape is wrong", the claim is usually presented as categorical rather than conditional on someone's preferences or goals. The thread is about examining what would make that kind of claim universally binding.
As for my own answer, I think that some norms can be binding in a stronger sense than prudential advice or social convention. My view is that such rules ultimately reflect constraints built into the structure of the world rather than authority, incentives, or shared feelings.

As a side note, you are too quick to dismiss comments or perspectives as moral nihilism or relativism and don't reckon with them.

The point is simply that subjectivism and nihilism answer the question by denying that moral rules have that kind of binding force at all. Which is a coherent stance, but it resolves the issue by removing the category under examination. Since both have already been brought up in the thread, further examining them is unproductive for the discussion.

Your comments also tend to lump all levels of "morals" together in the same tier of importance; is that your view?

No. The discussion here is specifically about rules that are presented as categorically binding. Clearly, things like etiquette or prudence or self-help advice exist, but those are not normally treated as moral prohibitions/obligations in the same sense claims like "rape is wrong" are treated.

The alternative to objective, known, iron-ribbed universal truth(s) is not inherently the absence of any truth, and not every moral prescriptive is of the same criticality.

True, some norms regulate trivial matters. But other norms regulate things like interpersonal conflicts. The latter category is where the question of bindingness becomes serious.

What is the import of an existential "binding" nature of specific morals?

The difference is the distinction between advice and obligation. If a rule is merely useful, socially approved, or likely to produce good outcomes, then violating the rule may be unwise or unpopular. But if it is genuinely normatively binding, then violating it is not just imprudent, but wrongful.

---

What kinds of things would you accept as features of reality?

Anything that actually obtains in the real world.
For example, physical structures, biological facts, properties of agents, relations between actions and outcomes, social relations between persons, and so on.
The point of the question is not to restrict the category in advance, but simply that, if a genuine moral obligation supposedly exists, then it must ultimately be grounded in some feature of reality, rather than merely in how people define words.
The step still needs explanation; feature of reality -> ??? -> moral obligation

---

Okay, don't drop terms without any explanation for the reader.

Pascal's wager is a well-known argument in philosophy of religion. In simple terms, it goes roughly like this:
If God exists and you believe in God, the payoff is infinite (salvation).
If God exists and you don't believe, the loss is infinite.
If God doesn't exist, the costs/benefits of belief are finite either way.
So, given that uncertainty, Pascal argues that believing in God is the rational or safer bet because of the higher expected payoff.
It's not an answer to the question of the thread because it treats religious commitment as a prudential gamble, rather than something that is proven true.

 

[Friend of Dorothy Parker]

The reason I asked what makes a moral rule binding rather whether there are any binding ones is because most moral language already treats certain claims that way.

I recommend explaining your assumptions in future efforts to engage.

For example, when people say "rape is wrong", the claim is usually presented as categorical rather than conditional on someone's preferences or goals. The thread is about examining what would make that kind of claim universally binding.

Your original question was not "what would," but "what does.". Very different propositions.

You've set up a false conversation, because you haven't framed out the questions well enough, and it's taken pages and pages (and pointed questions) for you to start to explain key aspects of what you actually mean.

But that aside and to your example: let's make it slightly easier and avoid veering into standard politico-social debates. If we expand or revise from "rape" to the general concept that violation of a human person's body without permission is a moral wrong [n.b.., there are many exceptions to this principle in virtually every society....or at least debates on those exceptions, which suggests...a non-obligatory essential truth], what are the options? Immoral because:
- doesn't belong to you
- causing pain or bad things
- harm without mitigating cause or invitation

which could be based on notions such as
- humans are made in God's image and therefore violating a human offends God
- there is a unique and ineffable quality to humanity that is inherently valuable (with or without God) and therefore wrong to harm
- humans commonly have a reflexively negative response to severe harm of a weaker or subdued human being
- if common, societies can't grow and prosper
- collateral damage to others as a result of the origin l act
-existence in a world with no regard for humans or one's own bodily integrity is a poor existence, and if there is not something positive about humanity's existence and behavior, then we might as well be paramaecia
-it is animalistic and base, and we have brains that provide higher levels of sentience, so a waste of resources not to experience and honor that
- the only possible "right thing" is behaving non-destructively, because lack of prohibitions on destruction means the end
- such things are typically done under cover of some level, even if one may act with practical impunity, implying awareness of innate wrongness
- such things commonly cause revulsion, horror, desperation, or other negative impacts on a third party observing a severely harmful act
- such things commonly create a responsive reaction for revenge so it is against long-game self-interest

So - those are all various foundations (some of which you've already countered, I know; I'm not advocating them as the reason, just providing some) upon which one might rely to support that a concept has reachdd the level of a "binding" moral obligation (though again not necessarily accepting that presupposition). Which if any are compelling to you? Or alternatively, what would be? And why do you care if something is "binding"; do you think that that is the key to determination of a moral good? Free will concepts suggest otherwise.

As for my own answer, I think that some norms can be binding in a stronger sense than prudential advice or social convention. My view is that such rules ultimately reflect constraints built into the structure of the world

"constraints built into the structure of the world " - expand on this.

rather than authority, incentives, or shared feelings.
The point is simply that subjectivism and nihilism answer the question by denying that moral rules have that kind of binding force at all. Which is a coherent stance, but it resolves the issue by removing the category under examination. Since both have already been brought up in the thread, further examining them is unproductive for the discussion.

Again, this should have been framed out from the start.

No. The discussion here is specifically about rules that are presented as categorically binding

Name them.

. Clearly, things like etiquette or prudence or self-help advice exist, but those are not normally treated as moral prohibitions/obligations in the same sense claims like "rape is wrong" are treated.
True, some norms regulate trivial matters. But other norms regulate things like interpersonal conflicts. The latter category is where the question of bindingness becomes serious.
The difference is the distinction between advice and obligation. If a rule is merely useful, socially approved, or likely to produce good outcomes, then violating the rule may be unwise or unpopular. But if it is genuinely normatively binding, then violating it is not just imprudent, but wrongful.

---

I might also suggest that your original use of "binding," without a very prescriptive definition was inadequate as a term, because something "binding" commonly suggests either lack of choice, or consequences, and your use of it is very specifically not that. The questions are fun, but it's kind of cheap to pose a question that requires people to pin you down on what you actually meant.

 

[VargReallyDidNothingWrong]

The short version is that "God -> moral authority -> binding rules" explains who issues the rule, but it does not explain why the command itself becomes morally binding.

Nothing is truly "binding" in this world short of threats of punishment, pain or death (now or in the afterlife).

At the end of the day you're free to comply with any moral directive or not. Society has laws you need to follow (at least most of the time), but beyond those nobody can force you to follow any moral imperative without coercion or threats.

 

[XL xQgg?QcQCaTYDMjqoDnYpG]

The questions are fun, but it's kind of cheap to pose a question that requires people to pin you down on what you actually meant.

The question I asked in the OP did not require any assumption. Someone could answer it by saying nothing makes moral rules binding, or by proposing what does, and both kinds of answers have appeared in the thread.
Your objection seems to be that the question forced a clarification of what is meant by "binding". And that is exactly what philosophical questions are supposed to do.

what are the options?

The items in your list fall into a few recognizable categories such as social stability, value realism, theological grounding, prudential reasoning, psychological reactions... All of them are familiar attempts to justify moral rules, and the interesting question is not whether they exist, but whether any of them actually generate an obligation rather than merely appealing to incentives, preferences, consequences, or asserted values.

"constraints built into the structure of the world " - expand on this.

Consider the conditions required for argument itself.
When people argue, each participant necessarily acts as if the other has control over their own body (that is, the ability to speak, think, and present reasons). Attempting to deny that control while simultaneously engaging in argument produces a contradiction between the claim and the activity being performed.
That kind of situation indicates that some norms are implicit in the preconditions of certain human activities, rather than derived from authority, social incentives, or shared emotions.

Name them.

Prohibitions on things like murder, theft, and rape have already been mentioned in the thread. They are typical examples because people normally treat prohibitions of that kind as categorical rather than optional.

And why do you care if something is "binding"

Because there is a difference between saying "this tends to produce bad outcomes" and "this is wrongful".
That is, the former is only binding on someone who cares about avoiding bad outcomes, and the latter would be binding on everyone.

---

Nothing is truly "binding" in this world short of threats of punishment, pain or death (now or in the afterlife).

That's a description of compliance and not wrongfulness.
That is, the fact that a rule is backed up by threats does not explain why it would be morally wrong, rather than simply dangerous, to violate that rule. A mafia can extort you at any time, but certainly you wouldn't argue that the mafia's demand is morally binding.

 

[The Last Stand]

This also had me thinking: are animals bounded on morality? It sounds like morality is a human element guided through societal norms, learned behavior, personal perception, or most aptly "right" or "wrong." Since human beings are more complicated as mammals, I wish to err on the side that whatever is "binding" is determined by authority or a higher being.

 

[Tennessee Trash]

That is a move that needs justification.
The mere existence of an idea in human thought does not mean that it automatically becomes a feature of reality. Unicorns, for instance, exist as an idea, but the existence of unicorns as an idea does not generate real unicorns ontologically.
The step that still needs explanation is: idea of an ought -> property of reality that makes the idea true

Something existing physically does not make it any more real than another thing which goes not exist physically. Ideas are part of reality, just not the physical one. The 'form' of morality exists because it is possible to think it. Just as ideas themselves are real. And because ontologically morality is defined by its oughts, we know that these oughts exist.

Someone who grows up feral, alone, in the woods, has no sense of morality, but morality, even as an idea, exists independently of that person because it is an idea which is possible to think of. He also has no idea of gravity, but it exists. He is bound by morality regardless of whether or not he has any conception of it, because he makes a choice. He may not know what the, let's say, "morality constant" is, but it doesn't matter. His actions, whatever they are, will have a consequence, which are expressions of his choice. He believes, when making a choice to do anything, that he is achieving some kind of goal. What he 'ought' to do in that moment. Whether or not he knows anything about morality or has it himself as an idea is completely irrelevent. The point is that it is an idea that CAN exist, and we know it can exist, because we can think of it. It is ontologically true. He is always, in every moment he makes a choice, doing something that he thinks he ought to do.

Try this: Why is murder wrong? Well, murder is ontologically wrong because it is impossible for anyone to prefer to be murdered. If someone wanted to be murdered, it would not actually be murder, but closer to assisted suicide. Murder is wrong, ontologically. It is not the same as killing, though. Murder is just an idea, with nonphyiscal ideas to make it wrong, as opposed to killing. You kill plants to eat, but that is not murder. Murder is distinct due to the nonphyiscal, ontological implications of it, which we all acknowledge as real. But in the end, murder as a concept exists only as an idea. Without any idea aspect, Murder is merely killing. The idea of 'ought' is no less real.

This also had me thinking: are animals bounded on morality? It sounds like morality is a human element guided through societal norms, learned behavior, personal perception, or most aptly "right" or "wrong." Since human beings are more complicated as mammals, I wish to err on the side that whatever is "binding" is determined by authority or a higher being.

Yes. Everything is. Even a rock is bound by morality. While not able to use morality itself, it can be affected by beings that use morality. The rock can be thrown to kill someone, for example. Like, in theory, a massless object might not be affected by the gravitational constant, but a being of mass which is affected by gravity can indeed possibly affect the massless object potentially.

 

[Friend of Dorothy Parker]

The question I asked in the OP did not require any assumption.

It assumed that morality is or needs to be "binding."

Someone could answer it by saying nothing makes moral rules binding, or by proposing what does, and both kinds of answers have appeared in the thread.
Your objection seems to be that the question forced a clarification of what is meant by "binding". And that is exactly what philosophical questions are supposed to do.

If you want to engage in dialogue, you need to set the stage, which includes defining terms.

whether any of them actually generate an obligation rather than merely appealing to incentives, preferences, consequences, or asserted values.

Again, this is a reformulation of your inquiry. "Whether" is different that "what."

That kind of situation indicates that some norms are implicit in the preconditions of certain human activities, rather than derived from authority, social incentives, or shared emotions.

And again, this is a presupposition. Replace "indicates" with "might suggest," or be transparent that "indicates" is an "if" statement.

people normally treat prohibitions of that kind as categorical rather than optional.

Who has asserted that? Again, an "if" statement, aka, an assumption.

Because there is a difference between saying "this tends to produce bad outcomes" and "this is wrongful".
That is, the former is only binding on someone who cares about avoiding bad outcomes, and the latter would be binding on everyone.

General, broad agreement as to wrongulness is not "binding." And is not without exceptions.

Yes. Everything is. Even a rock is bound by morality. While not able to use morality itself, it can be affected by beings that use morality. The rock can be thrown to kill someone, for example. Like, in theory, a massless object might not be affected by the gravitational constant, but a being of mass which is affected by gravity can indeed possibly affect the massless object potentially.

A rock cannot be moral or immoral, because it posses no ability to make any decision, much less a moral one.

Again, the lack of definition of "binding" or "bound" is a fatal flaw in this discussion.

 

[XL xQgg?QcQCaTYDMjqoDnYpG]

This also had me thinking: are animals bounded on morality? It sounds like morality is a human element guided through societal norms, learned behavior, personal perception, or most aptly "right" or "wrong." Since human beings are more complicated as mammals, I wish to err on the side that whatever is "binding" is determined by authority or a higher being.

Generally, animals are not treated as moral agents. That is, when a wolf kills an animal or a cat plays with its prey, one normally doesn't call that morally wrong. The usual justification is that animals are acting according to instinct, conditioning, and immediate drives.
Usually, moral language presupposes an agent capable of understanding reasons, reflecting on actions, and deciding whether to follow or violate a rule. That is the reason why people tend to apply moral judgment to humans, but not to animals (or very young human children).
The distinction is not simply "human vs animal" but something closer to "beings capable of understanding and responding to reasons". It reminds me of an amusing quote from a philosopher, I'll paraphrase it as "We'll grant animals rights once they start petitioning for them".

---

Something existing physically does not make it any more real than another thing which goes not exist physically. Ideas are part of reality, just not the physical one. The 'form' of morality exists because it is possible to think it. Just as ideas themselves are real. And because ontologically morality is defined by its oughts, we know that these oughts exist.

How do you justify moving from "ideas exist" to "therefore moral obligations exist"?
The fact that something can be conceived as an idea does not make the content of that concept true. We can think of unicorns, fictional worlds, or impossible machines. The fact that a concept exists does not make the content of that concept true.
The question is not whether the idea of an "ought" exists (clearly it does), the question is whether anything about reality makes the content of that idea true.

Someone who grows up feral, alone, in the woods, has no sense of morality, but morality, even as an idea, exists independently of that person because it is an idea which is possible to think of. He also has no idea of gravity, but it exists. He is bound by morality regardless of whether or not he has any conception of it, because he makes a choice. He may not know what the, let's say, "morality constant" is, but it doesn't matter. His actions, whatever they are, will have a consequence, which are expressions of his choice. He believes, when making a choice to do anything, that he is achieving some kind of goal. What he 'ought' to do in that moment. Whether or not he knows anything about morality or has it himself as an idea is completely irrelevent. The point is that it is an idea that CAN exist, and we know it can exist, because we can think of it. It is ontologically true. He is always, in every moment he makes a choice, doing something that he thinks he ought to do.

No. Saying that someone chooses an action because they think they ought to do it is a description of goal-directed behavior. Every intentional action has the structure "goal -> chosen action". But that structure only shows what someone believes they ought to do, not what they actually ought to do. Otherwise, every single action would automatically be morally correct for the person performing it.

Try this: Why is murder wrong? Well, murder is ontologically wrong because it is impossible for anyone to prefer to be murdered. If someone wanted to be murdered, it would not actually be murder, but closer to assisted suicide. Murder is wrong, ontologically. It is not the same as killing, though. Murder is just an idea, with nonphyiscal ideas to make it wrong, as opposed to killing. You kill plants to eat, but that is not murder. Murder is distinct due to the nonphyiscal, ontological implications of it, which we all acknowledge as real. But in the end, murder as a concept exists only as an idea. Without any idea aspect, Murder is merely killing. The idea of 'ought' is no less real.

Same issue here. From the fact that nobody prefers to be murdered, it does not follow that murdering someone is morally wrong. At most, it shows that people dislike being murdered.
It is perfectly consistent for someone to hold the view "I do not want to be killed, but I am willing to kill others if it benefits me". Maybe brutal, definitely hypocritical, certainly not logically inconsistent. So the premise "nobody prefers to be murdered" still does not generate a moral obligation.

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It assumed that morality is or needs to be "binding."

You keep insisting that the question assumes something it does not.
The question "what actually makes a moral rule binding in the first place?" does not assume that moral rules are binding any more than asking "what causes lightning?" assumes that lightning has a particular cause. "Nothing makes them binding" is a perfectly valid answer. Several people in the thread have already given it.
Your repeated attempt to turn the discussion into a dispute over wording ("what" vs "whether", "indicates" vs "might suggest", etc.) does not address the substance of the issue. It is simply nitpicking.

If you want to engage in dialogue, you need to set the stage, which includes defining terms.

The notion that every philosophical question must begin with an exhaustive glossary is likewise mistaken. Terms are clarified through the discussion itself, that is how philosophical inquiry normally proceeds.

If you believe that moral rules are never binding in any meaningful sense, you can say that directly, although I probably wouldn't engage with that, seeing as that answer has already been made several times in the thread. If you believe they are binding, you can explain what grounds that bindingness. But what does not advance the discussion is continuing to police grammar and phrasing while avoiding the question itself.

 

[daffodils]

physical structures, biological facts, properties of agents, relations between actions and outcomes, social relations between persons, and so on.

None of these things can ground moral obligations.

 

[Friend of Dorothy Parker]

our repeated attempt to turn the discussion into a dispute over wording ("what" vs "whether", "indicates" vs "might suggest", etc.) does not address the substance of the issue. It is simply nitpicking

It is not. My questions and comments are substantive: "what" is a completely different inquiry than "whether." I am doing the work to isolate what you are actually asking (and how it fits in to any larger concept) because you failed to do so.

But so OK, to the response of "nothing makes specific morals "binding""(whatever you mean by that), what is your response again?

The notion that every philosophical question must begin with an exhaustive glossary is likewise mistaken. Terms are clarified through the discussion itself, that is how philosophical inquiry normally proceeds.

Also incorrect. It is useless to have a discussion when parties have completely different concepts of what is being discussed. You posited a specific question; surely you knew what you meant by your own words?

If you believe that moral rules are never binding in any meaningful sense, you can say that directly, although I probably wouldn't engage with that, seeing as that answer has already been made several times in the thread.

I've not taken a hard position because I am still looking for what your question actually is. And by the by, the fact that multiple people have raised a point does not mean that the points are now rendered null. But on that note: of what import is it to you, or to your line of thought that prompted the initial question, whether morals or independent truths (that do or don't "bind" people) exist independently or are human-based?

If you believe they are binding, you can explain what grounds that bindingness. But what does not advance the discussion is continuing to police grammar and phrasing while avoiding the question itself.

What do you mean by "binding"?

 

[XL xQgg?QcQCaTYDMjqoDnYpG]

None of these things can ground moral obligations.

The thread has reached 6 pages, so I'll summarize the different directions the discussion has taken so far

• What makes normative claims actually binding?
  • Nothing. <--- YOU ARE HERE
    Nothing grounds moral obligation -> moral rules are not truly binding.
    • Morality doesn't exist (nihilism)
      • Question: If that is true, then why have people spent thousands of years doing moral philosophy in an attempt to explain moral obligation rather than dismissing it?
    • Morality is subjective (subjectivism)
      • Problem: Under that view, "moral rules" boil down to preferences or enforced norms, which means that moral obligations in the stronger sense simply don't exist. See: nihilism
  • Something.

 

[XL xQgg?QcQCaTYDMjqoDnYpG]

What do you mean by "binding"?

You keep demanding a definition of "binding" as if the discussion cannot proceed without one, yet the thread already contains multiple clear uses of the term (e.g. claims like "rape is wrong" presented as categorical rather than optional). At this point the problem is not ambiguity, it is your refusal to engage with the concept that's being discussed.

My questions and comments are substantive: "what" is a completely different inquiry than "whether."

That insistence is equally pointless. If the answer to "what makes moral rules binding" is "nothing", then the result is simply that moral rules are not binding. That position has already been raised several times in the thread. Repeating it while pretending it is a procedural objection does not add anything.
The options are straightforward.
If you think nothing makes moral rules binding, then you are endorsing the "nothing grounds moral obligation" branch already identified earlier. If you think something does make them binding, then explain what it is.
Continuing to demand definitions while refusing to address the substance is just stalling. I am not interested in turning the thread into an endless exercise in semantic policing.

 

[Friend of Dorothy Parker]

You keep demanding a definition of "binding" as if the discussion cannot proceed without one, yet the thread already contains multiple clear uses of the term (e.g. claims like "rape is wrong" presented as categorical rather than optional). At this point the problem is not ambiguity, it is your refusal to engage with the concept that's being discussed.

So by "binding" you mean "applicable." OK.

That insistence is equally pointless. If the answer to "what makes moral rules binding" is "nothing", then the result is simply that moral rules are not binding.

All you had to do was admit you poorly phrased your question and omitted salient assumptions.

That position has already been raised several times in the thread. Repeating it while pretending it is a procedural objection does not add anything.
The options are straightforward.
If you think nothing makes moral rules binding, then you are endorsing the "nothing grounds moral obligation" branch already identified earlier. If you think something does make them binding, then explain what it is.

What do you think makes moral rules binding?

Continuing to demand definitions while refusing to address the substance is just stalling. I am not interested in turning the thread into an endless exercise in semantic policing.

When a person requests something, it is their burden to articulate what they want.

So, has anyone in the thread said anything that resonates with you?