What makes a moral rule actually binding? - Discuss the ethics of ethics

[quarter_grifter]

The dilemma I pointed out

The 'dilemma' you're pointing out is just recycled judaic rules-lawyering, so yeah, this whole post is just a giant troll. It was a good one, but now... it has lost its luster because, like all jews, your 'victory' is never great enough. Bind that.

 

[rel=alternate]

Not quite the question I asked, rather this is an answer to the question of how norms get internalized or enforced within a culture
Like, things like guilt and shame can explain why people feel bound or why they comply, but they do not yet explain what makes the norm binding (rather than merely socially reinforced

I have not gone through the thread yet, but J am a bit confused.

You're implying that there are other levers than societal, people are not addressing, but I am not sure there are.

For a moral code to be binding, it must be internalized within a culture. I don't see how it works any other way.

 

[XL xQgg?QcQCaTYDMjqoDnYpG]

What makes imprudence in sin not a sin?

Why restate the claim rather than explaining it?
Saying that imprudence in sin is sin assumes the very point that is in question.
The issue I raised earlier still stands. An action can be imprudent because it harms the person doing it. Touching fire harms you, but that does not make touching fire morally wrong.
The question remains: why would harming yourself make the action morally wrong rather than simply imprudent?

---

The 'dilemma' you're pointing out is just recycled judaic rules-lawyering, so yeah, this whole post is just a giant troll. It was a good one, but now... it has lost its luster because, like all jews, your 'victory' is never great enough. Bind that.

The dilemma I pointed out is a standard problem in moral philosophy.
It has nothing to do with trolling and everything to do with how moral authority is supposed to work. If you are not interested in addressing it, that's fine, but that's the question that is being discussed.

---

I have not gone through the thread yet, but J am a bit confused.

You're implying that there are other levers than societal, people are not addressing, but I am not sure there are.

For a moral code to be binding, it must be internalized within a culture. I don't see how it works any other way.

I think the confusion comes from the fact that two different questions are being blended together.
One question is how moral rules become internalized or enforced within a society. That can be explained by means of cultural reinforcement, shame, reputation, law, religion, and so on. All of these mechanisms can make people feel bound and there's more than enough evidence that they're effective at stabilizing norms across generations.
The question this thread is actually about is earlier in the causal chain. It's about what would make a rule actually morally binding, rather than merely widely internalized or strongly enforced.

Lemme try showing the distinction in an example
A society might strongly internalize a rule like "do not criticize the king". People could be made to follow it via shame, punishment, and cultural norms. But that still leaves open the question: Is criticizing the king morally wrong, or simply prohibited and socially punished?
In other words, the issue I'm trying to discuss is not how norms spread or how they get internalized, but what would make violating a rule morally wrong in the first place rather than simply costly, imprudent, or disapproved of.

---

On another meta note, now that discussion has slowed down a bit
A large number of replies, probably the overwhelming majority so far, have answered questions that are adjacent to the one that I asked, rather than the question itself. This is fairly standard with precise philosophical questions, but it is still noticeable.

Most replies so far fall cleanly within these three categories:
"Where do moral rules come from?" - religion, culture, biology, community pressures
"Why do people follow rules?" - punishment, social backlash, legal enforcement, incentives, reputation
"Why are rules useful?" - cooperation, stability, flourishing
The question I asked, however, is not that. I reckon a teacher would give a failing grade for submitting an essay on the wrong topic.

Many replies so far effectively reduce moral rules to consequences, incentives, or enforcement. Which is a perfectly coherent position, but it amounts to some form of moral nihilism. That is, "rules exist, but nothing makes them binding beyond outcomes or pressure"
Thousands of years of moral philosophy have largely been attempts to avoid exactly that conclusion. So simply saying "nothing makes them binding" is just giving up on the issue rather than solving it.
I mean, if someone wants to openly concede nihilism, that's fair enough, but that doesn't add much to the discussion.

So if anyone actually wants to address the question I posed in the OP, the missing step is still the same: what turns a description of the world into a claim about what someone ought to do?

 

[Recreational Polluter]

It seems to me that people pursue the apparent good, and as such once something is determined to be a ‘good’ whatever moral precepts which allow for or aide in the attainment of that good become obligatory; insofar as people will naturally follow said rules or engage in / adopt such behaviors that allow the pursuit of that good, unless persuaded otherwise. For example by a greater good, temptation by other perceived goods or by some deterrent.

So any given moral rules are really only binding in the sense that people can’t not do what they believe is the right thing do. (Well they could, I suppose, deliberately choose to do something they believe is wrong but generally don’t.) The binding is therefore self-imposed and only exists so long as any particular individual holds the rule as an axiom or as an instrument for attainment of a perceived good. One is therefore ultimately bound only by their own conscience.

It is why societies suffer when the people no longer share in common ethics or ideas of the good/goods. The population is then no longer really bound by those moral rules which came about to foster attainment of a particular good(s). Once so unmoored from any common agreement moral rules may become seen as not only not binding but actively prohibitory to the attainment of the new apparent goods.

 

[[VΩiD] SoKAftH]

why would harming yourself make the action morally wrong

Moral health is necessary for life.

 

[XL xQgg?QcQCaTYDMjqoDnYpG]

It seems to me that people pursue the apparent good, and as such once something is determined to be a ‘good’ whatever moral precepts which allow for or aide in the attainment of that good become obligatory; insofar as people will naturally follow said rules or engage in / adopt such behaviors that allow the pursuit of that good, unless persuaded otherwise. For example by a greater good, temptation by other perceived goods or by some deterrent.

So any given moral rules are really only binding in the sense that people can’t not do what they believe is the right thing do. (Well they could, I suppose, deliberately choose to do something they believe is wrong but generally don’t.) The binding is therefore self-imposed and only exists so long as any particular individual holds the rule as an axiom or as an instrument for attainment of a perceived good. One is therefore ultimately bound only by their own conscience.

It is why societies suffer when the people no longer share in common ethics or ideas of the good/goods. The population is then no longer really bound by those moral rules which came about to foster attainment of a particular good(s). Once so unmoored from any common agreement moral rules may become seen as not only not binding but actively prohibitory to the attainment of the new apparent goods.

Looks to me like a classical "apparent good" account, very Aristotelian or Thomistic in flavor
Essentially, people pursue what they perceive as good -> rules that help attain that good feel binding -> conscience enforces them
That is an explanation of motivation, but not an explanation of normativity. That is, the rule feels binding because it is tied to a person's conception of the good.
The problem is that this still makes the rule conditional on that prior belief. If someone has a different conception of the good, or simply rejects the good in question altogether, the rule would no longer bind them under that structure.
In other words, the account you gave explains why people follow rules they believe serve their goals, but it does not yet explain what would make the rule morally binding, rather than simply instrumentally useful for pursuing a perceived good.
That is, "perceived good -> obligation", the gap between the two is missing

---

Moral health is necessary for life.

So, moral rules are grounded in what sustains or destroys human life?
If that's the correct interpretation of what you meant, then why would life generate moral obligations in the first place? That is, someone can choose actions that harm their own life. Like, what makes a self-destructive action morally wrong than simply self-destructive?

 

[rel=alternate]

, "rules exist, but nothing makes them binding beyond outcomes or pressure

To answer quickly, I somewhat disagree.

If we talk about moral, then it's about being able to relate to the downside when you or people you care about may be affected in similar ways.

I can smoke and blow it right in your face without much pressure or fear of outcome. I just would not do it because I know it is not something I or any relative would want to go through.

I am not sure if that touches on your question.

 

[XL xQgg?QcQCaTYDMjqoDnYpG]

To answer quickly, I somewhat disagree.

If we talk about moral, then it's about being able to relate to the downside when you or people you care about may be affected in similar ways.

I can smoke and blow it right in your face without much pressure or fear of outcome. I just would not do it because I know it is not something I or any relative would want to go through.

I am not sure if that touches on your question.

That does touch on the issue, and what you're describing is actually a very common moral intuition
The idea "I avoid harming others because I can imagine the harm happening to me or people I care about" is basically empathy or reciprocity. It can absolutely explain why many people choose to follow certain rules.
Imagine someone, let's call him Hasan, who fully understands that others would dislike the harm, but Hasan simply doesn't care. Hasan understands the downside perfectly well, but he just doesn't find it compelling.
Under the empathy model, that rule would fail to bind Hasan. In spite of that, it would still explain why many people follow the rule, but it would not explain what makes the rule morally binding in the first place.
That is, the step between "this is something people generally avoid doing" and "this is something a person ought (not) to do", that is the issue I'm trying to discuss in the thread

 

[[VΩiD] SoKAftH]

Why would life generate moral obligations in the first place?

For the same reason life generates self-interested obligations of other kinds.

What makes a self-destructive action morally wrong than simply self-destructive?

What righteousness do you imagine that is not also self-interested?

So, moral rules are grounded in what sustains or destroys human life?

 

[XL xQgg?QcQCaTYDMjqoDnYpG]

For the same reason life generates self-interested obligations of other kinds.

Under that view, moral rules are grounded in self-interest (actions that sustain life are moral, and actions that destroy life are immoral)
The difficulty is that self-interest does not generate categorical obligation, it can only produce prudential advice
For example, an action might shorten someone's life while still benefitting them in other ways they care about. Or someone might knowingly accept a shorter life in exchange for some other perceived good.
Under what you describe, the rule would no longer bind them. It would simply mean they're choosing a different tradeoff.
Self-interest can explain why someone should do something if they want a certain outcome, but it does not yet explain what would make the rule morally binding in the stronger sense that mutual claims are usually presented in.

---

Lmao then go read moral philosophy instead of rejecting perfectly legitimate answers because you refuse to understand them and pretend like you're not trolling.

The thread is about the grounding of moral normativity. If you're not interested in addressing that question, then there isn't much else to discuss.

 

[Friend of Dorothy Parker]

The question I posed is what makes a rule normatively binding in the first place

You failed to state an assumption that moral rules are normatively binding as your starting-point and have responded to most people chastising them for not observing your assumption. I would posit that that your your first question should be not "what makes a moral rule normatively binding?" but "are moral rules normatively binding?"

Most, if not all, moral philosophies present their rules as binding that stronger categorical sense.

No, they don't. A basic ethics course presents the many moral structures as constructions. Which is what they are. Most people arrive in the world with some innate basic sense of good/ bad & right/ wrong. The ones who are bereft of those concepts are the psychopaths. And the result of rampant psychopathy is unsustainable as a society, and corrosive for an individual.

Humans have many different schema for thinking about morality. Some look to some version of God or a text as the guiding light, and those are fine and work for many. But if you're talking about something beyond those concepts, the answer is that it just is. Pointless or self-interested killing, or thievery just because, or duplicity, or exploitation, or other cheap ways to advance oneself are - with fairly wide variation (and of course exceptions and situational specifics) - generally universally agreed, and gut-felt, to be immoral/ wrong. They feel wrong and they turn humans to ugly creatures; they are also destructive to societies,

What the premise doesn't do is explain why a person is obligated to pursue

Again, this is your starting assumption. You're either being disingenuous or don't understand the actual starting point of your inquiry.

 

[[VΩiD] SoKAftH]

Under what you describe, the rule would no longer bind them in the stronger sense that mutual claims are usually presented in.

What do you mean?

 

[not william stenchever]

An actual German and a user who probably has nothing to do with the DDR who uses the flag as as their PFP starting the second 30 years war would be tragic yet deeply funny.

 

[XL xQgg?QcQCaTYDMjqoDnYpG]

You failed to state an assumption that moral rules are normatively binding as your starting-point

That is technically correct, but not particularly significant.
The question "what makes a moral rule binding?" presupposes that at least one such rule exists. A logically prior question could indeed be "are there any binding moral rules at all?"
The reason I say this is not decisive is that it only introduces a fork.
Either moral rules are not binding (moral nihilism), or at least one is.

Again, this is your starting assumption. You're either being disingenuous or don't understand the actual starting point of your inquiry.

If we begin with "are moral rules binding?", then two outcomes follow.
If the answer is no, the position is moral nihilism.
If the answer is yes, the question I asked immediately arises: what makes them binding?
So pointing out the presupposition doesn't resolve the problem, it simply moves the discussion one step earlier.
It is a normal philosophical move to begin from "given that X is claimed, what explains X?"

No, they don't. A basic ethics course presents the many moral structures as constructions.

They are presented as theories, but the theories themselves make categorical claims.
A Kantian doesn't say "honesty is a useful schema", they say lying is wrong because it violates the categorical imperative.
A utilitarian doesn't say "maximizing wellbeing is a construction", they say actions are wrong when they fail to maximize wellbeing.
A Christian ethicist doesn't say "divine command is a model", they say violating God's command is wrong.
These are presented as claims about what people ought to do, and not merely as descriptions of moral psychology.

Most people arrive in the world with some innate basic sense of good/ bad & right/ wrong.

Which explains moral psychology, not moral normativity.
Shared intuitions can explain why people feel that something is wrong. They don't explain why violating the rule would actually be morally wrong rather than simply widely disliked.
History is full of societies that have shared strong moral intuitions about things like slavery, blasphemy, and caste hierarchies. The existence of widespread moral intuition did not by itself make those norms morally binding.

the answer is that it just is.

That is simply an assertion.
The question I raised in the thread concerns what would make such rules binding rather than merely strongly felt or socially reinforced. "It just is" does not supply that explanation.

---

What do you mean?

Typo on my part, I meant to say "moral claims", not "mutual claims".
The point I was making is that the framework you described grounds rules in self-interest. Under that structure, a rule applies to someone only insofar as it helps them achieve what they want (e.g. sustaining their life)
However, moral claims are usually presented more strongly than that. When people say something like "murder is wrong", they usually mean that a person ought not to murder, not merely that murder tends to be bad for the person committing it.
So the issue I was pointing to is the difference between prudential advice ("this will harm you") and a moral prohibition ("you ought not do this")

 

[[VΩiD] SoKAftH]

the issue I was pointing to is the difference between prudential advice ("this will harm you") and a moral prohibition ("you ought not do this")

What issue do you take?

 

[XL xQgg?QcQCaTYDMjqoDnYpG]

What issue do you take?

The point I was making was not about the observation itself, but the type of claim.
A statement like "this action harms you" is a descriptive claim about consequences. It tells you what will happen if you do something.
Moral claims, however, are usually presented differently. When people say something like "murder is wrong", they are not just describing consequences, they are making a normative claim about what someone ought not do.
So the distinction I was pointing to is simply this:
descriptive claim -> what will happen
normative claim -> what someone ought to do
The question in this thread is how one gets from the first type of claim to the second

 

[[VΩiD] SoKAftH]

Normative claims depend on reality being described.

 

[Tennessee Trash]

The same issue appears in your analogy. Even if morality existed as an objective feature of reality, like a universal constant, that would still not explain why violating it would be morally wrong rather than simply harmful or imprudent.
In other words, existence explains that something is, and the step I'm asking about is what would make that fact generate an ought.

The 'ought' is itself is the constant you are asking for. If morality exists, even as an idea or perhaps you might call it a 'form', then an 'ought' must also exist, as by definition, morality is in essence what one 'ought' to do. Just because we may not know as clearly what the 'ought' is, like we know what the gravitational constant is, does not mean that it does not exist.

Perhaps not dissimilar to the electron cloud model. There is a high probability that murder, the electron, is wrong, but we do not know often times where that line of 'murder' is drawn, and some might have a different definition. This is the 'cloud' and encompasses the various definitions of murder that we have. But, we do know with high certainty that murder is wrong be definition.

So it's like this. 1. We know that morality exists, because it exists as an idea in conscious thought. 2. By definition, an 'ought' must exist, since morality itself is defined by the 'ought'. 3. Just because we may not all agree on what the 'ought' is, does not mean that is does not exist. 4. Therefore, since an 'ought' does exist, so must a moral obligation which binds people, which is expressed by the resulting consequences of whether or not one fills that obligation. It is not necessary that anyone agrees upon or even for one person to follow or even know what the 'ought' is for it to exist, for it exists by the very nature of the idea of morality even existing.

 

[[VΩiD] SoKAftH]

That means there is no way to identify a belief or experience as mistaken prior to negative outcomes. And even then, only if those outcomes are judged to be bad enough to outweigh the perceived fruits
In that case, truth is treated as provisional so long as it remains beneficial. That makes "objectivity" descriptive of God's order, but not an epistemic constraint on belief (since false but fruit-bearing beliefs would be indistinguishable from true beliefs until they fail)
That means disagreement can't be resolved at the level of truth, only at the level of outcomes

In the long run, after life, truth and outcomes are the same.

 

[Red Saltire]

Even if I accept your premise that the good consists in fulfilling a thing's telos, what the premise does is identifying what counts as flourishing. What the premise doesn't do is explain why a person is obligated to pursue that flourishing.
What makes the fulfillment of a telos morally binding rather than simply a description of what flourishing would look like?
I'm not calling into question that teleology can explain functional evaluation, but functional evaluation does not automatically produce moral obligations.

To accept my premise is to accept that acting “good” would require acting in accordance with this principle, which would be the equivalent of an obligation. As in, failure to achieve these higher orders of fulfillment or flourishing would be “bad” or “wrong,” definitionally.

The mistake you’re making here is assuming that just because these states of affairs can be described, they must be reducible to mere description. I’m saying that while these states can certainly be described, their very nature contains aesthetic truths that make demands on our souls. So much so that when someone among us fails to recognize or act in accordance with these truths, eg a killer of children, we are obligated to destroy them.