They're one and the same. Having and following a moral code is not passive, it is active. It is not just a modifier on every action, it is a reaction to adverse events that occur and refusing to do nothing in response. If one has a moral code, one acts by ways of that code. If one doesn't, one didn't.
Furthermore it's binding because of a positive feedback loop. Internally, you might feel good about something. Interpersonally, you might get a reward out of kindness. You might prevent harm to someone you love and see that in return. You might make your tribe stronger by creating trust and removing time-wasting barriers as a result. Again this is predicated on biology. If the individual can't or won't see these benefits in the long term a morality won't materialize, and it won't be effective if it collapses into "how does not stealing from my neighbor benefit me" (for example) exclusively. Again back to the belief in a higher power to keep this loop stable.
Externally, once it's recognized that these are things that make life easier, not harder, laws codify that morality. That's society in a nutshell.
It is a positive feedback loop that takes the spurring of strong and intelligence men to start, and systems set up to reinforce it, with force or with negative reinforcement. When you're talking about something as fundamental as what the individual does in a vacuum (in effect) there aren't any more answers than that.
What you're describing is a mechanism for how moral systems emerge and stabilize.
To the question why norms spread and become entrenched, a feedback loop between biological instincts, social rewards, trust within a group, and eventually legal codification is a perfectly coherent and sensible answer.
The question I'm concerned with is slightly earlier than that.
That is, while a feedback loop can explain why a behavior becomes advantageous or widely adopted, it does not yet explain why violating the rule would be morally wrong rather than simply disadvantageous.
For example, cooperation often creates trust and strengthens a group. That explains why cooperative norms spread. But if someone can benefit by defecting while avoiding retaliation, the feedback loop itself does not make that defection morally wrong. All it means is that the strategy is less likely to work if many people adopt it.
I consider the emergence and persistence of norms an answered question. The unanswered question is still the one from the opening post: what would make a rule morally binding rather than simply a strategy that tends to produce good outcomes?
The consequences of the rule are what make it binding.
As I have explained several times, that doesn't make it morally binding, it only makes it backed by consequences.
If consequences are the only thing doing the work, then the situation reduces to incentives (someone follows the rule because violating it would produce an outcome they dislike)
However, what if a person accepts the consequences and violates the rule anyway? Under that structure, the act is risky or costly, but not morally wrong in any categorical sense.
Consequences can explain compliance, but they don't explain what would make the rule morally binding in the first place.
You have the answer. It's been explained. It's God
And that is not an answer that resolves the question.
Again, there's two possibilities with that answer.
A: a rule is morally binding simply because God commands it. In that case, morality depends entirely on command. If the command changes, the rule would change.
B: a rule is morally binding because God's command reflects something that is already right independently of the command. In that case, the grounding is not in the command, but in that independent structure.
So what makes the rule morally binding in the first place? Is it the command itself? Or is it what makes the commandment correct?
If you accept my premise, that “the good” is ontologically codependent on the fulfillment of the telos, then moral claims are granted truth value and obligation naturally follows.
Emphasis on
obligation naturally follows
Even if I accept your premise that the good consists in fulfilling a thing's telos, what the premise does is identifying what counts as flourishing. What the premise doesn't do is explain why a person is
obligated to pursue that flourishing.
What makes the fulfillment of a telos morally binding rather than simply a description of what flourishing would look like?
I'm not calling into question that teleology can explain functional evaluation, but functional evaluation does not automatically produce moral obligations.