Jeffrey Hellberg was one of the attorneys on the AHC appeal.
"AHC raises two arguments that challenge our jurisdiction over this appeal. First, in AHC’s second issue on appeal, AHC argues that the March 6 order granting Alan’s motion to dismiss was a final judgment and that the April 14 final judgment is therefore void because it was signed after the trial judge had lost plenary power. If AHC is correct that the March 6 order was a final judgment, it necessarily follows that AHC’s and Dinah’s notices of appeal were untimely filed, and we must dismiss the appeal. Second, in its motion to dismiss Dinah’s cross-appeal, AHC argues that Dinah’s notice of appeal was untimely in any event because her notice-of-appeal deadline began to run either on January 18, 2012, when her motion to dismiss was supposedly denied by operation of law, or on January 30, when the trial judge signed the order granting AHC’s nonsuit of its claims against Dinah."
So they tried to argue that the defendant's cross-appeal was filed in an untimely manner and should be dismissed. The appeals court argued that if that were the case and the 06 March ruling were the actual ruling and the 30 April one was not, then the entire appeal should be dismissed as it is late and gay. They also argue that the ruling on 06 March is the ruling that removed plenary power from the trial court, and thus as no decision on sanctions or fees had been in said ruling then there is nothing to pay out (remember how Lemoine tried to say that Vic could at least appeal the sanctions and fees if he appealed after the ruling on those, but not the entire TCPA?).
"AHC also relies on our Straza decision, in which we reaffirmed the rule that an otherwise final judgment is final even if it does not address court costs. See 124 S.W.3d at 406 (citing Thompson v. Beyer, 91 S.W.3d 902, 904 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.)). Straza is distinguishable because it concerned only an omission of an award of court costs from an otherwise final judgment. The March 6 order in this case, by contrast, not only failed to award costs but also set a further hearing on a pending request for “damages and costs,” meaning in this context costs, attorneys’ fees, and sanctions. The pendency of Alan’s request for attorneys’ fees and sanctions and the March 6 order’s reservation of those matters for future litigation make this case more analogous to cases such as Crites, Unifund, and Interhealth. "
They tried to argue that a final judgment is final, period, end of discussion, even if it does not say final judgment on the paperwork...but they argued the exact opposite when trying to dismiss Vic's notice of appeal as early and hetero.
