Principal-Agent problem as it applies to representative democracies

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autisticdragonkin

Eric Borsheim
True & Honest Fan
kiwifarms.net
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25 de Feb, 2015
Modern representative democracies face an example of the principal-agent problem wherein the representatives have their own interests independent of their representatives. This can lead to problems wherein the political system favors incumbent representatives as opposed to opposition members or representees. What are possible solutions to this?
 
You can't represent someone else's interests 100% because there are opportunity costs involved.

You could argue that if people aren't motivated enough to vote the incumbents out of office, then the political system has done its job. The people are happy enough with the status quo that they're not willing to waste an afternoon voting.

I don't see this as an inherent problem.
 
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