Open Source Software Community - it's about ethics in Code of Conducts

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Did anyone catch Bernstein's paper released this month, he's insinuating (again) the cia niggers put backdoors in the kyber, downlplaying the uses of ECC in post quantum, overhyping the security of kyber and ML-DSA, calling it basically an overengineered piece of shit.
It's an obvious thing for NSA et al to do (and in line with their previous behavior). The more annoying thing is Google et al playing along (though it helps Google's stock with how much they've invested in quantum shit that doesn't work).
 
Did anyone catch Bernstein's paper released this month, he's insinuating (again) the cia niggers put backdoors in the kyber, downlplaying the uses of ECC in post quantum, overhyping the security of kyber and ML-DSA, calling it basically an overengineered piece of shit.
I suppose now might be a good time to take out a life insurance policy on Bernstein.
 
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Grsecurity: Here’s some patches that make hacking into Linux systems incredibly difficult, they’re free of charge
The World: this is security sperging
Linus Torvalds: this is pure garbage
Grsecurity: Ok, we’ve finally decided to charge money for our security patches, and contractually prevent you from sharing them with others
The World: how dare you charge money for your work! how dare you prevent me from publishing your work online!
Grsecurity: But you spent a decade saying my work is shitty. Why would you want to share it?
The World: ……..don’t you get clever with me!
Yeah, exactly. The FSF's stated goals for the GPL of propagating free modifiable software is really important, but the only way we can achieve that objective is by passing laws that regulate proprietary software, like the push on right to repair and whatever Calfiornia and the EU will end up doing wrt protecting consumers who buy live service games.

So in practice GPL is just more utopian communism like the Gen Z breadtubers who think socialism means other people work and they chill at home with free gamepass weed DoorDash. GPLniggers want experts to work for free and for it to be impossible to earn a living making software. All because Richard Stallman was too weird to get a real job as a young man. And with communists it's always about control, they hate the idea that grsecurity is acting on its own so they get upset whatever they do.
 
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If you’re not into Wayland as a display manager, it seems like your options are slowly dwindling. Xorg isn’t exactly a hotbed of activity, and the one fork everyone knows about is best known as a political lightning rod.

Because of faggots like you who believe the hype and care more about the wailing and screeching of perpetually offended losers and control freaks than someone focused on creating the best possible tools, thus perpetuating as truth the notion that the XLibre dev team are doing everything in their power to work toward a world where white heterosexual men can spend all their idle hours dragging Negroes and homosexuals to death behind our pickup trucks.

Luckily, Rust developers can apparently never see a tool without pulling it into their heavily oxidized bucket of crabs

Out of the frying pan into the gas chamber. What a solution.

One commenter offers a fair and balanced analysis:

I was referencing XLibre, which depending who you ask is either a brave libertarian stand against corporate HR culture in open source, or an evil hateful fascist’s personal vendetta machine.

I don’t have a dead guy at that funeral, so haven’t dug into it– but if I had to bet money, I’d say the truth is that it’s a software fork rather than either of those things. Opinions on the quality of code going into XLibre differ as well; no surprise they break down almost exactly along political lines. OTH, it’s not vibe coded, so there is that.

Another commenter also mentions the hated name as well as linking to XLibre's Github, and a third notes:

I find it disingenuous that the original post can’t even use the name Xlibre.
 
Fucking faggots using circular bullshit reasoning to attack Xlibre. "It's controversial because we labeled it controversial, which is why it's controversial, okay?" It just works. Meanwhile I have to help my friends who don't know what a DE or WM or compositor are so they have Wayland and thus headaches.
 
Still using runit (or busybox init), still using mdev, still sticking with x11, still laughing from afar.

Imagine you set up a computer once, just once, and then it just works and you don't have to change anything and it is always predictable and understandable how it works, even years from now on, without being dependent on the newest brain fart of some corpo-adjecent nerd and his clique on a power trip. The very concept of this makes some people very, very angry.
 
Still using runit (or busybox init), still using mdev, still sticking with x11, still laughing from afar.

Imagine you set up a computer once, just once, and then it just works and you don't have to change anything and it is always predictable and understandable how it works, even years from now on, without being dependent on the newest brain fart of some corpo-adjecent nerd and his clique on a power trip. The very concept of this makes some people very, very angry.
Yeah but Xorg is insecure! Don't you know that an attacker can just see what the windows are?! Just forget that if they're accessing your computer they can do that with Wayland, and forget that you need a bunch of hacks to get not even feature parity with Xorg.
 
Yeah but Xorg is insecure! Don't you know that an attacker can just see what the windows are?! Just forget that if they're accessing your computer they can do that with Wayland, and forget that you need a bunch of hacks to get not even feature parity with Xorg.
I said it in some thread on here before but the funny thing is that this argument isn't even true. X11 always had a security extension and can differentiate between trusted and untrusted programs. As you might guess, untrusted programs are not allowed to see the screen contents of trusted programs or the clipboard. It's kinda poorly documented but I had that set up for a while, security wise it works best if you also can sandbox the untrusted applications in other ways so they have no chance to access the magic cookie.

The big problem I had with it was that programs just automagically assumed they're trusted (firefox was a big offender) and then would end up crashing if they couldn't access some things. There might've been more problems, it's been a while.
 
I said it in some thread on here before but the funny thing is that this argument isn't even true. X11 always had a security extension and can differentiate between trusted and untrusted programs. As you might guess, untrusted programs are not allowed to see the screen contents of trusted programs or the clipboard. It's kinda poorly documented but I had that set up for a while, security wise it works best if you also can sandbox the untrusted applications in other ways so they have no chance to access the magic cookie.

The big problem I had with it was that programs just automagically assumed they're trusted (firefox was a big offender) and then would end up crashing if they couldn't access some things. There might've been more problems, it's been a while.
Imagine replacing something for the sake of being a controlling cunt about it. I could never imagine that happening in the open source software world.
 
The big problem I had with it was that programs just automagically assumed they're trusted (firefox was a big offender) and then would end up crashing if they couldn't access some things. There might've been more problems, it's been a while.
That's what they're trying to streamline with xnamespace now. There's been steady progress and a big push to actually get them functional, but as of ~2 months ago they are still busted and crash if you assign a program to any namespace but root. Obviously this isn't their primary concern right now, but given time, I'm sure they'll get it done.

Edit: I've shilled this before, but wayland.fyi is a cool little clique of suckless-adjacent people making simple software for Wayland. I like it. It is what I imagine Wayland should be to begin with, thin wiring that lets people do their own thing easily. Yes, yes, there's muh fracure and no standardization, but that really isn't my concern here. My concern is that you either use Drew "Lolicon/Pedophile" DeVault's wlroots cum rag or full DEs like GNOME or KDE. Niri/Smithay and Hyprland are there, but man, I want something that doesn't suck the "MOVE FAST BREAK THINGS MORE FEATURES NOW NOW NOW" dick so hard.
 
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I said it in some thread on here before but the funny thing is that this argument isn't even true. X11 always had a security extension and can differentiate between trusted and untrusted programs. As you might guess, untrusted programs are not allowed to see the screen contents of trusted programs or the clipboard. It's kinda poorly documented but I had that set up for a while, security wise it works best if you also can sandbox the untrusted applications in other ways so they have no chance to access the magic cookie.

The big problem I had with it was that programs just automagically assumed they're trusted (firefox was a big offender) and then would end up crashing if they couldn't access some things. There might've been more problems, it's been a while.
Okay but Wayland is the future CHUD
 
I said it in some thread on here before but the funny thing is that this argument isn't even true. X11 always had a security extension and can differentiate between trusted and untrusted programs. As you might guess, untrusted programs are not allowed to see the screen contents of trusted programs or the clipboard. It's kinda poorly documented but I had that set up for a while, security wise it works best if you also can sandbox the untrusted applications in other ways so they have no chance to access the magic cookie.

The big problem I had with it was that programs just automagically assumed they're trusted (firefox was a big offender) and then would end up crashing if they couldn't access some things. There might've been more problems, it's been a while.
The security extension has actually been implemented through another extension called XACE for the last 26 years, which allows for more fine-grained control. It was implemented by NSA for use with selinux on rhel systems where they had a GUI to control the permission of every application for every allowed operation (mandatory access control). Kinda like android permissions, but long before android did it. It also has things like censoring, so if a screenshot application tried to take a screenshot of the screen, privacy sensitive applications could be blacked out. You can technically still run this but I have never seen anyone do that.

Xlibre has expanded upon XACE mechanism with xnamespaces, because as you mentioned the way its implemented in xorg server it gives permission denied if you dont have access, which crashes programs. Xnamespaces instead sandboxes the applications into their own "virtual" roots, so programs have access to everything inside their own environment without seeing other programs so they never crash, they instead dont have access to other programs (unless you explicitly give them permission).
 
Xlibre has expanded upon XACE mechanism with xnamespaces
Yeah I'm blurry on the details, I just remember it didn't work well because many programs assumed access to things they didn't have access to. It's good that xlibre has picked up expanding on it. I always felt though for the average user it's one of these things where you have other problems if a process became compromised to this degree, even though I guess I can still think of situations where it's a good defense-in-depth to have.
 
Yeah I'm blurry on the details, I just remember it didn't work well because many programs assumed access to things they didn't have access to. It's good that xlibre has picked up expanding on it. I always felt though for the average user it's one of these things where you have other problems if a process became compromised to this degree, even though I guess I can still think of situations where it's a good defense-in-depth to have.
I agree. In my opinion it's a psyop. Nobody has got their security or privacy compromised through x11 in the 40 years that it has existed. If it was really an issue then people would have solved those rather easy issues in xorg that makes program crash when xace is used and distros would have had added options to enable it.
Nobody really cares about such "security" issues in reality, which is evident by the fact that pretty much no distro makes startup scripts (such as ~/.bashrc / ~/.zshrc) read-only and even if you use flatpak the most popular flatpaks have permission to write to $HOME, to modify those startup scripts. When a process has become compromised it can modify PATH or LD_PRELOAD environment variables in the startup script to inject all programs with malware, including wayland programs. This includes hijacking sudo/su, which allows malware to get root access on your system.

Also nobody on linux ever talks about vram privacy issues. When one process frees vram, another process that allocates vram will actually get the same vram, uncleared. So it can see what other processes displayed and this works even in flatpak (or other containerization methods) with maximum sandboxing. This means that the permission prompt that wayland shows when taking a screenshot is useless.
I remember once when I rebooted from windows into linux and then took a screenshot and I was able to see my windows desktop in the black unused areas of my multi monitor setup.
Browsers actually deal with this, by clearing vram before giving the data to other websites/tabs.
 
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I agree. In my opinion it's a psyop. Nobody has got their security or privacy compromised through x11 in the 40 years that it has existed. If it was really an issue then people would have solved those rather easy issues in xorg that makes program crash when xace is used and distros would have had added options to enable it.
I also think the brokenness from enforcing security boundaries in X11 has been significantly overblown by some poorly written X11 clients.
At least when I looked at it last any (simple/straightforward) Qt using application would have no significant detrimental effects, Qt went to great lengths to gracefully degrade for missing/blocked X11 stuff (everything from SHM to clipboard/dnd). But especially Firefox (ab)uses GTK badly and did a ton of direct X11 stuff with very brittle code that could've been fixed if security at that layer was a priority.
 
I agree. In my opinion it's a psyop. Nobody has got their security or privacy compromised through x11 in the 40 years that it has existed. If it was really an issue then people would have solved those rather easy issues in xorg that makes program crash when xace is used and distros would have had added options to enable it.
The history of exploitation in the 20th century is harder to explore, but here’s an attack tool that lets you escalate privileges up to root on Solaris. It was written in 2006.

 
In my opinion it's a psyop.
The entire X11 vs Wayland shit bugs me because Wayland has the makings of greatness but a team too fucking retarded to do anything with it. Literally, what is the downside of proclaiming that wlroots is an official WAYLAND TM LIBRARY and slowing the release cadence to like, one major patch every 4 months? Would literally fix 90% of the issues in the entire ecosystem imo. Hevel is comfy as hell if you like mouse oriented movement by the by.
 
The history of exploitation in the 20th century is harder to explore, but here’s an attack tool that lets you escalate privileges up to root on Solaris. It was written in 2006.

That's unrelated. That's an exploitation of a bug in the xorg server, not the x11 protocol. That exploitation would be possible even if x11 had wayland-level sandboxing. Of course such vulnerabilities have existed in all software (that have large enough user base and runs as root), and that exploit still hasn't affected anybody as the vulnerability got fixed. Every distro runs the xorg server as the user rather than root now, so its not anymore more vulnerable than any wayland compositor, or simply modifying ~/.bashrc / ~/.zshrc
 
That's unrelated. That's an exploitation of a bug in the xorg server, not the x11 protocol. That exploitation would be possible even if x11 had wayland-level sandboxing.
You didn’t make that caveat before, it’s only when you’re shown to be talking out of your ass that you make up new rules.

(Also, this bug predates the name “xorg”.)

Of course such vulnerabilities have existed in all software (that have large enough user base and runs as root), and that exploit still hasn't affected anybody as the vulnerability got fixed.
You have no way of knowing that. You don’t know if the folks listed as discovering the bug kept it private for a while before disclosing it. You don’t know if other folks also knew about the bug and kept their mouths shut.

Please stop confidently making up claims about security. You have no idea what you’re talking about.
 
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