War How Assad's army collapsed in Syria: demoralised conscripts, absent allies - Interviews and intelligence documents Reuters found in an abandoned military office in the capital, paint a detailed picture of how Assad's once-feared army had been hollowed out.

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Farhan al-Khouli, Syrian military conscript who deserted his post on the first day of the rebel offensive, walks at a horse stable in Damascus, Syria December 10, 2024.
REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir


Twenty-three-year-old Syrian military conscript Farhan al-Khouli was badly paid and demoralized. His army outpost in scrubland near the rebel-held city of Idlib should have had nine soldiers but it just had three, after some had bribed the commanding officers to escape serving, he said.

And, of the two conscripts with him, one was regarded by his superiors as mentally unfit and not trusted with a gun, Khouli said.

For years, the Islamist rebels of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) had sat behind the nearby frontline, with Syria's long civil war frozen. But on Wednesday, Nov. 27, Khouli's commanding officer - at another post behind the frontlines - called his mobile phone to tell him a rebel convoy was heading his way.

The officer said the unit should stand its ground and fight.

Instead, Khouli put his phone on airplane mode, changed into civilian clothes, dropped his rifle and fled. As he walked along the road back south, other groups of soldiers were abandoning their posts too.

"I looked back and saw everyone walking behind me. When they saw one person flee, everyone started to toss their weapons and run," he told Reuters this week in Damascus, where he has found work at a horse stable.

In a little less than two weeks, the rebels would sweep into the capital Damascus, toppling former president Bashar al-Assad as his army simply melted away. The rout abruptly ended a 13-year conflict that had killed hundreds of thousands of people.

Reuters spoke to a dozen sources including two Syrian army deserters, three senior Syrian officers, two Iraqi militia commanders working with the Syrian army, a Syrian security source and a source familiar with the thinking of Lebanese group Hezbollah, one of Assad's main military allies.

The sources, along with intelligence documents Reuters found in an abandoned military office in the capital, painted a detailed picture of how Assad's once-feared army had been hollowed out by the demoralization of troops, heavy reliance on foreign allies particularly for the command structure, and growing anger across the ranks at rampant corruption.

Most of the sources asked not to be named because they were not authorised to talk to media or feared retribution.

Since the war began in 2011, Assad's army command had come to depend on allied Iranian and Iran-funded Lebanese and Iraqi forces to provide the best fighting units in Syria, all the senior sources said.

Crucially, much of the Syrian military's operational command structure was run by Iranian military advisors and their militia allies, they said.

But many of the Iranian military advisers had left this spring after Israeli air strikes on Damascus, and the rest departed last week, said the Iraqi militia commanders, who worked alongside them.

Hezbollah fighters and commanders had already mostly left in October to focus on the escalating war in Lebanon with Israel, the source familiar with Hezbollah thinking said.

The Syrian army’s own central command and control centre no longer functioned well after the Iranian and Hezbollah officers left and the military lacked a defence strategy, particularly for Syria's second city of Aleppo, a Syrian colonel, two Syrian security sources and a Lebanese security source familiar with the Syrian military said.

By contrast, rebels in the northwest, on paper numerically far weaker than the army, had spent years consolidating under a single operations room that coordinated their groups and units in battle, an International Crisis Group report said after the fall of Aleppo.

Reuters was unable to contact a current representative of the armed forces. Syria's new most powerful figure, HTS chief Ahmad al-Sharaa told Reuters on Wednesday he would dissolve Syria’s security forces. Iran’s mission to the United Nations, the Iraqi militias and Hezbollah did not respond to requests for comment.

ALEPPO​

As Aleppo came under attack in late November, army units were not given a clear plan but were told to work it out for themselves or to fall back to the strategic city of Homs to try to regroup, two Syrian security sources said.

Aleppo fell without a major fight on Nov. 29, just two days after the offensive began, sending shockwaves through the military, three senior Syrian officers said.
What was left on the ground was a Syrian army severely lacking in cohesion, all the sources said, describing multiple units that were undermanned because officers were accepting bribes to let soldiers off duty, or had told soldiers to go home and were collecting their salaries themselves.

In 2020, the army had 130,000 personnel, according to think tank IISS' Military Balance report, describing it as significantly depleted by the long civil war and transformed into an irregularly structured, militia-style organisation focused on internal security.

In the days ahead of the regime's collapse on Sunday, the United States had information of broad levels of desertions and military forces changing sides, as well as some elements fleeing to Iraq, a U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said.

Reuters could not establish the overall manpower shortage in the military or current force strength.

The Syrian army sources described officers and troops alike as demoralised by pay that was consistently low even after painful military victories earlier in the war and by reports, which Reuters could not verify, that Assad's close family were growing immensely rich.

On Nov. 28, the General Command of the Army and Armed Forces issued a telegram, ordering all troops to be on full combat readiness, according to a military document found by Reuters at an Air Intelligence office in Damascus.

In a sign the regime was desperate, Syria’s Air Intelligence Directorate, a key agency close to the Assad family, accused its men of “laxity” at checkpoints throughout the country after one was overrun by rebels in the south on Dec. 1, and warned of punishment “without leniency” if they did not fight, the document seen by Reuters shows.

Despite the orders and threats, increasing numbers of soldiers and officers began to desert, all the sources said.
Instead of confronting the rebels, or even unarmed protesters, soldiers were seen by residents of Syrian cities, and in many videos that began circulating online, abandoning their posts, changing into civilian clothes and going home.

Reuters journalists entering Syria on Sunday found army uniforms still strewn across Damascus streets.

OFFICERS​

The corruption and poor morale went up through the ranks.

Many midranking officers had been growing increasingly angry in recent years that the army's sacrifices and successes during the war were not reflected in better pay, conditions and resources, two serving, one recently retired and one defected officer said.

In 2020, Russia and Turkey agreed a deal that froze the frontlines after Assad retook all major cities and the main highway linking Damascus to Aleppo, further partitioning a country also split by Kurdish-controlled areas.

But Syria's economy continued to reel from U.S. sanctions and reduced foreign aid, said Aron Lund, a fellow at Middle East-focused think tank Century International. Rampant inflation ensued.

"Things just got worse for everyone, except for the oligarchs and elites around Assad. That seems to have been incredibly demoralizing," Lund said.

While decrees in 2021 roughly doubled military salaries to keep up with inflation that topped 100% that year, buying power rapidly fell anyway as the Syrian pound crashed against the dollar.

Col. Makhlouf Makhlouf, who served in an engineering brigade, said that if anybody complained about corruption they were called in for questioning at a military court - something that had happened to him more than once.

"We were living in a scary society. We were afraid to say a word," Makhlouf said. He had been stationed in Hama but deserted before the city fell to the rebels on Dec. 5, he said in an interview in Aleppo on Tuesday.

Anger had been building particularly over the past year or so, a serving senior military intelligence officer said, saying there was "growing resentment against Assad," including among core high-ranking supporters from his Alawite minority community.

YEARS OF DECAY​

Khouli's military experience illustrated the army's problems - and helps explain his lack of loyalty.

He was drafted for the obligatory 18-month service at age 19, after having paid-off an officer to delay his service for a year.

When his service period expired, he was ordered to remain in the army indefinitely. He deserted but was later picked up by a patrol, put in prison for 52 days and then sent to the remote outpost near Idlib.

He was paid 500,000 Syrian pounds ($40) a month. Army rations were often pillaged before arriving. Sometimes his entire pay went on buying more food, he said.

Comrades with money would pay officers $100, which he lacked, to get out of service, Khouli said. Khouli's brigade was supposed to have 80 soldiers, but in fact there were only 60, he said.

He described bad treatment from officers, including being assigned heavy manual labour digging earth berms in both very hot and very cold weather and during nights.

Reuters was not able to verify independently the details of his experiences.

One former major described the use of forced conscripts as a "fatal mistake".

A former army logistics serviceman, Zuhair, 28, said in an interview in Damascus on Tuesday he had seen officers steal and sell electricity generators and fuel. "All they cared about was using their positions to enrich themselves," he said.

He had fought for Assad for years but he had cousins among the rebels and when they advanced, he cheered, he said. "I don't know how to describe how happy I am," he said.

RELIANCE ON ALLIES​

To fight back the earlier opposition uprising, which began with protests in 2011, Assad relied on allies. Russia sent jets that bombed rebel positions, Iran sent military advisers and fighters from Hezbollah. Iran-backed militias from Iraq and another group it formed from Afghan Shi'ite fighters also came.

Their fighting skill and well-being contrasted with Syria’s own soldiers. An Iraqi militia commander serving near Aleppo said he knew of a Syrian platoon meant to consist of 30 soldiers that had only eight present.

The militia often invited those soldiers to eat with them out of pity at the poor condition of their rations, the commander said.

Hezbollah and allied militias regarded the regular Syrian forces with little more than contempt, the Iraqi militia commanders and a source familiar with Hezbollah thinking said.

They did not trust them for important operations and often would not fight alongside them, those sources added.

OCT. 7 HAMAS ATTACKS​

Iran’s presence in Syria was curtailed in the months following the attack on Israel by Tehran-backed Hamas on Oct. 7, 2023, the Iraqi militia commander based near Aleppo and an Iraqi military adviser based in Damascus said.

Israel’s response to Hamas’ incursion included escalating strikes on Iran-linked targets, including in Syria.

On April 1, a strike killed top commanders from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards at a building in an Iranian consular compound in Damascus. Israel has not confirmed or denied responsibility for the strike.

The Iraqi sources both said the number of Revolutionary Guards commanders present in Syria dropped significantly after that. One said Syria’s military operations command became ineffective as a result, a situation exacerbated by the withdrawal of Hezbollah in October.

Russia conducted air strikes on rebels as they advanced on Hama and Homs, both sides said at the time, but unlike in earlier phases of the war there were no effective ground forces able to benefit.

By Saturday, Dec. 7, Russia was calling for a political transition. The Kremlin and Russia foreign ministry declined to comment for this story. Russia, the Kremlin said on Tuesday, had “spent a lot of effort” to help Assad during the civil war but the situation had then deteriorated.

In Aleppo, Syrian forces had relied on Hezbollah to provide operational command, an Alawite Syrian army colonel said. Without Iranian advisers or Hezbollah, the army could not hold onto territory near the city, the colonel, the Iraqi commander and the Iraqi adviser said.

Iraqi militias sent more fighters to Syria last week, but they found all the contact channels to Iranian military advisors had been cut, the Iraqi commander said.
On Friday, after rebels had taken the city of Hama, the Iraqi groups were told to leave, he said.

"The battle for Syria was lost from day one," the Iraqi military adviser added.

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You find everyone pointing to things like the pay, but the truth is that armies in the Middle East are incredibly corrupt and inept. It's not like the SAA was effective even at the height of the fighting. ISIS Hunters were just Wagner and some Syrian elements who were worth a shit. Hezbollah is Hezbollah. The NDF were a fucking joke. Three ISIS fighters would roll up on dirtbikes and scatter an NDF garrison of 20-50. There was what, the 4th and 5th Divisions and some special forces units that did anything of note? IIRC those two divisions were militants that were formally put under the command of the Russians/Iranians and not actual SAA. There were rumblings that they actually didn't do fuck all and were given credit for militant victories because of the commanders' relationships to the regime.

Paying half of your salary to not have to show up is a norm in Arab militaries. The same thing happened when ISIS was rampaging across Iraq. Entire battalions existed only on paper with senior officers and enlisted filing paperwork and collecting checks. Only the most fanatical of troops have any sort of discipline over there. It's why the Free Syrian Army was shit until the salafists showed up. Then the SAA had to get bolstered by foreign fighters to counter. The vaunted Iraqi Republican Guard units were absolutely smashed in Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, but at least they and Saddam's Fedayeen, a Ba'ath loyalist militia founded in after Desert Storm, would actually stand and fight unlike most of the Iraqi Army. Assad's forces were always militias and foreigners during the civil war, those worth a shit anyway.

Talk to family and friends who served and you'll inevitably hear stories of incompetence, non-sensical logistics, and inadequate leadership. They aren't wrong, but it absolutely pales in comparison to what you'll find in Third World militaries. It actually has to been seen to be believed. I got a lot of stories ranging from them brushing their teeth with the same toothbrushes we taught them to clean their riffle with , to watching a unit get into a nighttime firefight with their own checkpoint at least once a week. I genuinely believe the only reason the Iraqi Army unit deployed to our area of operations were only pretty inept instead of completely inept were because they were Shia in a Sunni area and they really wanted to kill Sunnis.
 
It's interesting to see the specifics in this situation, but it's a tale as old as time itself: Arabs can't fight. That's why Israel can sweep three to four Arab armies at a time. They're only loyal to their tribes, their families and their Islamic sects, and not the arbitrary 'countries' that were formed as a result of whatever post-WW1 and post-WW2 lines were drawn on a map. There's zero morale, there's rampant corruption, there's incredible incompetence, and different branches all actively work against each other. This is true in virtually every single Arab army.

The only exceptions are the zealots with religious fervor or the well-equipped Special Forces units. Even then, the 'Special Forces' of Arab armies aren't usually in roles similar to the Navy SEALs or the Green Berets - they're for internal security, (ie. oppressing the population) and not addressing external threats, so they're in a disadvantage against any enemy who isn't untrained rabble.
 
It's interesting to see the specifics in this situation, but it's a tale as old as time itself: Arabs can't fight.
More like they have no one they want to fight for. If they were willing to view their country as their community it would be a different story, but as often is the case with third worlders, they can only view their community as something extremely small and insular.
 
It's interesting to see the specifics in this situation, but it's a tale as old as time itself: Arabs can't fight. That's why Israel can sweep three to four Arab armies at a time. They're only loyal to their tribes, their families and their Islamic sects, and not the arbitrary 'countries' that were formed as a result of whatever post-WW1 and post-WW2 lines were drawn on a map. There's zero morale, there's rampant corruption, there's incredible incompetence, and different branches all actively work against each other. This is true in virtually every single Arab army.

The only exceptions are the zealots with religious fervor or the well-equipped Special Forces units. Even then, the 'Special Forces' of Arab armies aren't usually in roles similar to the Navy SEALs or the Green Berets - they're for internal security, (ie. oppressing the population) and not addressing external threats, so they're in a disadvantage against any enemy who isn't untrained rabble.
https://www.meforum.org/middle-east-quarterly/why-arabs-lose-wars

This shit bears repeating over, and over, and over again. If the Chinese are a bunch of bug-men, then the Arabs are a bunch of rat-men, yes-yes.
 
For the first Khouli deserter Assad soldier now working as a farmhand, isn't he worried at all about being profiled in Reuters as an Assad loyalist with his name and picture in the international press?

Or is this a 4D chess move where he's intentionally outing himself showing to his new masters that he was a good boy who put down his weapon and ran before they rolled in?
 
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Kinda seems like Assad just gave up. He never officially called for help from his Allies or made a request for Iranians to enter the country.

He had warnings about the offensive and chose not to act.

On top of that, he just left without ever informing his own family and friends nor even his brother or warning him to flee. (Bashar’s family was already in Moscow.)

Sure, sanctions are one thing, but Syria isn’t a country without resources. He could also have looked to China and Russia for investments, something he refused to do.

Seems like Maher Assad, a tough general and Bashar’s little brother should have taken over running the country after the civil war. Bashar was never really cut out to be a ruthless dictator.


For the first Khouli deserter Assad soldier now working as a farmhand, isn't he worried at all about being profiled in Reuters as an Assad loyalist with his name and picture in the international press.

Or is this a 4D chess move where he's intentionally outing himself showing to his new masters that he was a good boy who put down his weapon and ran before they rolled in?

Yeah, he’s screwed now. And not just him, all the soldiers. They chose to run, so now they can be taken out one by one by the head cutters. There are already bodies piling up on the roadsides, and Arab social media is full of videos of Kurdish and SAA soldiers getting summarily executed.
 
Where in the article does it point out that the SAA had already taken a hundred thousand (at least) casualties. I mean its been 14 years. After a certain point, there is no money, and there are no more men.
That doesn't happen if you're funded by someone else, and have tens of thousands trained in another country...
 
Arabs can't fight. That's why Israel can sweep three to four Arab armies at a time
Meh, kinda a myth. Sure, there were plenty of times that Arab armies just collapsed, but also plenty of examples one opposite.

Parts of the Syrian army and of the Egyptian army performed pretty well in the ‘73 war.

Neither the Iranian nor the Iraqi army collapsed during the Iran/Iraq war, despite an incredibly brutal conflict.

Unbound by inefficient Arab states, they seem to do a better job. Some of the best fighters in Afghanistan in the 80ies were Arab volunteers.

Hezbollah kicked Israel’s ass in the ground war in 2006. And this year their guerilla units also did well.
Israel’s battle plan called for crossing the Litani river in Lebanon, and despite having decimated the higher tiers of the leadership, and total dominance in the air and mechanized units, they not only didn’t reach the Litani, they also only penetrated half a dozen to a dozen kilometers into Lebanon.

Hamas’ military units in Gaza are also still functional and regularly fires rockets to this day, despite over a year of war and Gaza being leveled to the ground.

So Arabs can clearly fight when they’re not serving under an inefficient and corrupt state.

Where in the article does it point out that the SAA had already taken a hundred thousand (at least) casualties.
After the war was apparently won, Assad also got rid of many of the old guard of officers that helped win it. And replaced them with the loyalists that totally failed him this time around.

Homs was strategically vital, yet the troops there were told to retreat even before the fighting really had begun.
 
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It collapsed because it was attacked by Turkeyyyey, Israel and the USA simultaneously as a last push before Trump is sworn in next month.
 
The average Arab Army isn't the problem, it's the endless and unwinnable asymmetrical gruella war you end up fighting if you try and occupy an Arab country that grinds you down until you have to give up for economic/political reasons.

They don't fight well for their country or commanders, but, they will never let you have their backyard.
 
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Yeah, that about lines up with what's been reported of the SAA these past couple years & months (and throughout the decisive rebel offensive itself). Assad got extremely complacent & didn't use the ceasefire period between 2020 & November of this year to rebuild either his army or the country (which would've gotten him a groundswell of genuine popular support), he became a drug lord specializing in the captagon trade and turned the SAA into more of a cartel than an actual army. Loads of troops got demobilized in the interim (from everything - SAA 'regular' ranks, NDF/militia, even Palestinian auxiliaries recruited from refugee camps in Syria) not just due to the relative quiet of the past years, but because the state literally couldn't pay them due to both sanctions and Assad & friends pocketing whatever defense budget they still had, apparently certain that they'd won and that even if they actually hadn't their foreign allies could just bail them out again.

The result was that the SAA, a force which already needed Hezbollah/Iran/Russia to hard-carry it away from the precipice of defeat on multiple past occasions in this civil war, got completely hollowed out and lost the 13-year war in 11 days. And also that Assad's support among the religious minorities, even his own (Alawites), completely disintegrated. I noted as much in the Happenings thread, but it was amazing to witness first large Christian towns like Mhardeh, and then Assad's home province on the coast where most of the Alawites live, all yield bloodlessly in a matter of days to the rebels when 10 or 5 years ago, they would've fought to the death. There's no way they all just 110% bought HTS leader Al-Jolani/Al-Shara's new woke rhetoric about how he's now an enlightened respecter of non-Muslims, dude's still an Islamist with a pretty grisly record of sectarian massacres (especially heavily targeting Alawites) from the mid-2010s. And the Alawites in particular had a really good position from which to keep fighting if they so chose (the coast is protected by a mountain range, there's a Russian port & airbase there, and at least some of the SAA formations leaving Homs went to the coast with their equipment still intact) but they didn't.

Let that sink in: somehow, here at the end, Assad had degenerated enough as a leader that his own sect opened their gates to a guy who had a well-recorded history of butchering them for no reason beyond being Alawites (but he promises those days are behind him now).
Kinda seems like Assad just gave up. He never officially called for help from his Allies or made a request for Iranians to enter the country.

He had warnings about the offensive and chose not to act.

On top of that, he just left without ever informing his own family and friends nor even his brother or warning him to flee. (Bashar’s family was already in Moscow.)

Sure, sanctions are one thing, but Syria isn’t a country without resources. He could also have looked to China and Russia for investments, something he refused to do.

Seems like Maher Assad, a tough general and Bashar’s little brother should have taken over running the country after the civil war. Bashar was never really cut out to be a ruthless dictator.
Frankly, that's just post-facto cope. Iran has spent $50 billion on Assad's cause and was already still in the country, they lost a general in a decapitation strike during the early part of the battle for Aleppo (Kioumars Pourhashemi, KIA on 28 November). Iran also tried to push Iraqi Shiite militias on its payroll to assist Assad, but anyone who crossed the border got bombed by the US and the US-backed SDF (Kurds) captured the Abu Kamal border crossing they usually came through on December 6, and they tried to resupply the SAA/Hezbollah/both by air but got turned around by Israeli fighter jets on December 1. Hezbollah had been buckbroken by Israel yes, but they still tried to move up to 2k troops in to assist Assad in the Homs area (said troops notably got bombed by Israel both while entering & leaving Syria). Russia was bombing away constantly until the very last day or two, there were reports that they'd struck hospitals in rebel-occupied Aleppo and I know for sure there were videos of them trying to bomb the bridge over the Orontes at ar-Rastan to try to stop the rebel advance (rebels moved down a different road to the east, through Salamiyah, as a result).

I don't think Assad so much didn't choose to act decisively in response to warnings, as he couldn't. The SAA, as noted, had been allowed to decay & rot in utter shambles for years due to complacency & the usual corruption that comes with tinpot dictatorships of any kind. And all of his foreign allies were busy with their own business, or had been crippled from their war with Israel just now; they still tried to help out as much as they could but it just wasn't enough. If he made the decision to give up, it didn't come until after the battle for Hama had concluded on December 5 (this would be after the SAA's elite Tiger Forces got annihilated by the rebels, more rebel cells popping up at ar-Rastan & Talbiseh jeopardized the retreat to Homs and made it impossible to set up a defense outside that city, and the foreign help he was getting proved inadequate); before that point, although losing Aleppo in one day after it had previously withstood a rebel siege for 4 years was certainly hugely humiliating, it still looked like the SAA could still turn the situation around & stabilize the front line until next year at least.

Also Maher is overrated, his 4th Armored Division was an 'elite' force that actually got funded properly (as expected of the dictator's brother's own unit) and was supposed to be the last line of defense in Damascus, but they were previously most effective against hugely outgunned rebel units in past campaigns and ended up folding like a cheap suit no different than the rest of the SAA this time.
 
I don't think Assad so much didn't choose to act decisively in response to warnings, as he couldn't.
Assad’s actions during the crisis speak for themselves. He never went on TV to make a speech, never officially asked Iranians for help, and the only official call he made during the crisis was to the president of Abkhazia of all places.

Assad clearly has been checked out for a while, and a country like Syria doesn’t last long without a leader.

As you yourself wrote: He didn’t do anything to rebuild the country after war ended. And granted: Sanctions made that harder, but simultaneously Syria isn’t a country without resources.

Russia was eager to invest, Assad turned them down. China could have invested, Assad didn’t even bother showing up to any summits, BRICS or otherwise.

Instead, after 2018 he fired the battle hardened general and replaced them with cronies, kicked out the vast majority of Iranian troops, and tried to inch closer to the Gulf countries, despite having little to offer them. To people he DID have something to offer: Erdogan, he never bothered to get into talks with, despite the fact that Erdogan has been eager to meet and settle refugee issues and other matters.

Assad clearly has been checked out for a while, and that’s one of the reasons the regime collapsed.

Iran also tried to push Iraqi Shiite militias on its payroll to assist Assad

One of the reasons the Shiite militia didn’t enter the country, is that Assad’s government never issued an official request for intervention.

(During the civil war both Russia and Iran defended their intervention with the fact that their presence had been requested by the Syrian government. For an American it may seem superfluous, but in much of the world “playing by the rules” is still important. Just look at how much time the UN wastes on pointless Israel resolutions.)

You could also tell in the days right before Assad fled that Russia’s and Iran’s tone had changed somewhat and were now talking about negotiations.

Clearly they had doubts about Syrias cohesion and hesitated with sending in troops that could be seen as an invasion.

Russia has good relations with the Gulf countries and Iran has developed much better ties with the Gulf countries the past couple of years. The calculus had changed a bit since 2015.

The Rebel offensive was fairly small and casualties on both sides are in the hundreds not thousands. Could they have been stopped if Russia flew in brigades, and Iran didn’t care about optics or threats? Likely.

But that wouldn’t have changed that the SAA had just collapsed. Suddenly they’d be in the country as occupiers and would likely have gotten trapped in a full on civil war. Which arguably would have been an even worse outcome than just cashing in the chips in Syria.

Also Maher is overrated
He’s not as good as the other general, the Tiger that they had. Don’t remember his name right now.

But clearly he’s got that touch of brutality a strong man leader needs to have, and seemed far more interested and devoted to Syria than Bashar who just let everything slide.

A man like Maher, as well as the troops under his command, also has so much blood on their hands, that they know it’s a life or death fight.
 
Surprise, treating your soliders like shit in a civil war will rank the moral.
 
Assad’s actions during the crisis speak for themselves. He never went on TV to make a speech, never officially asked Iranians for help, and the only official call he made during the crisis was to the president of Abkhazia of all places.

Assad clearly has been checked out for a while, and a country like Syria doesn’t last long without a leader.

As you yourself wrote: He didn’t do anything to rebuild the country after war ended. And granted: Sanctions made that harder, but simultaneously Syria isn’t a country without resources.

Russia was eager to invest, Assad turned them down. China could have invested, Assad didn’t even bother showing up to any summits, BRICS or otherwise.

Instead, after 2018 he fired the battle hardened general and replaced them with cronies, kicked out the vast majority of Iranian troops, and tried to inch closer to the Gulf countries, despite having little to offer them. To people he DID have something to offer: Erdogan, he never bothered to get into talks with, despite the fact that Erdogan has been eager to meet and settle refugee issues and other matters.

Assad clearly has been checked out for a while, and that’s one of the reasons the regime collapsed.
We don't disagree on what happened, just the why. Rather than defeatism (which would've seemed premature until this November) I thought those were signs of complacency, a guy who 'checked out' because he thought he already had this in the bag as of 2018-20 (tbf, everyone thought that until a few weeks ago). Even the reversal to sucking up to the Gulf kingdoms wasn't that big of a surprise, Syria used to be an Arab League heavyweight (they got a League mandate to fuck around in Lebanon back in 1976) and the Arab League/GCC isn't a monolith, the UAE for example has gone against the Saudis in Yemen and has a business relationship with Iran (although relations have worsened since the Abraham Accords and especially that kidnapping & killing of a rabbi in the UAE, with Iranian plotting suspected). Assad was never going to actually oust Russia/Iran because that would 100% have gotten him coup'd by their allies & forces inside the country a long time ago, but he probably thought that with the rebels reduced to Idlibistan (not even 20% of the country) and seemingly safely contained, he could start making some deals to get the Gulf money flowing into his pockets.

As far as the failure to rebuild goes, sanctions aside, I believe we can safely say that's Assad's own fault. One of the biggest ways AJ made himself appear like a better leader compared to Assad was by smartly spending the money Turkey gave him not just on his army but also on building up services in Idlib & improving quality of life for the people under his rule - a civilian police department, sanitation, electricity, even fucking shopping malls.



Meanwhile Assad didn't even seem to have tried in places like Deir ez-Zor, which look pretty much the same (bombed out ruins & all) as it did seven years ago when fighting there died down. He might've had limited resources due to the sanctions, but if he had put those resources into rebuilding the country instead of his own & his associates' pockets, he would surely have had way more people willing to fight & die for him, at least in his own home provinces. Instead the only vision he seemed to offer, in the end, was corrupt stagnation & decay forever. I guess it's true what they say, the normies will put up with a lot as long as they're made comfortable, and 'a lot' in Syria's case (even for Christians, Alawites and other religious minorities) apparently includes even an Islamist regime as long as said regime pretends(?) to have moderated & doesn't kill them all right off the bat.



Having allied troops leave I don't think was his choice entirely, either - obviously, Russia and Hezbollah got rather busy with other problems these last couple years and needed to move many of the troops/resources they had in Syria elsewhere as a consequence. With Iran, my understanding is that they wound down the presence of units like Liwa Fatemiyoun (Shiite Afghan mercenaries) because 1) the war looked as though it was as good as won by 2020 and 2) it's expensive keeping that many soldiers on your payroll and pointless when there's no longer any major battles being fought. Assad sure as shit wasn't going to pay for them given that he couldn't even pay his own army & affiliated militias (hence his own demobilizations). Him hating Erdogan was no surprise considering that Erdogan was still occupying territories in northern Syria and propping up the rebel SNA, the worst fighters in Syria whose ranks are comprised of various lesser Islamists previously curbstomped by HTS and who couldn't do shit without Turkish artillery & airstrikes clearing their way; likely he thought that once HTS in Idlib was dealt with, he could easily take them out even with a weakened SAA.

Tl;dr I don't think Assad was a defeatist at heart until after December 5 this year (he had no reason to be since it looked like his final victory was just a matter of time since 2020, even HTS initially named their operation 'Deterrence of Aggression' and thought about pushing the SAA out of artillery range of Idlib instead of taking Aleppo), just incredibly lazy & complacent.
One of the reasons the Shiite militia didn’t enter the country, is that Assad’s government never issued an official request for intervention.

(During the civil war both Russia and Iran defended their intervention with the fact that their presence had been requested by the Syrian government. For an American it may seem superfluous, but in much of the world “playing by the rules” is still important. Just look at how much time the UN wastes on pointless Israel resolutions.)

You could also tell in the days right before Assad fled that Russia’s and Iran’s tone had changed somewhat and were now talking about negotiations.

Clearly they had doubts about Syrias cohesion and hesitated with sending in troops that could be seen as an invasion.

Russia has good relations with the Gulf countries and Iran has developed much better ties with the Gulf countries the past couple of years. The calculus had changed a bit since 2015.

The Rebel offensive was fairly small and casualties on both sides are in the hundreds not thousands. Could they have been stopped if Russia flew in brigades, and Iran didn’t care about optics or threats? Likely.

But that wouldn’t have changed that the SAA had just collapsed. Suddenly they’d be in the country as occupiers and would likely have gotten trapped in a full on civil war. Which arguably would have been an even worse outcome than just cashing in the chips in Syria.
Well they did arrive early on, it's just that they got bombed by the Americans before they could help and Assad's forces in-country fell apart too fast after that for them to make a difference. (Again this was in late Nov, early Dec between the fall of Aleppo which caught everyone by surprise, and the fall of Hama which effectively destroyed the SAA's remaining morale).

Re: Iran, it's worth noting that he only sat down with the Iranian foreign minister & seemed despondent on December 2, at which point the rebels had been stopped from conquering Hama immediately (their raiding parties left the city as soon as the SAA regained some of their frayed nerves & went back in, two days before that) but were gaining ground around the city & threatening to flank the defenders. The Tiger Forces were also taking huge losses and would soon be rendered non-operational (something HTS was all too eager to brag about like, a day or two later). Prior to that, it was reported that he actually did meet with the Russians on November 28 (right before Aleppo fell) but he was told that Russia was too busy in Ukraine to increase the assistance they were giving him. Clearly he still had some hope of turning the situation around then.

I do think the casualties (on all sides) being so low was because the SAA disintegrated. They put up their biggest fight at Hama (where a few more rebels were killed than SAA troops) and once that was done, that was curtains for any meaningful SAA resistance. HTS had become disciplined enough not to shoot fleeing/surrendering SAA troops for the most part and the Southern Front/FSA guys in the south were never as bloodthirsty as the jihadis to begin with; while there were still battlefield executions & such this time, those were mostly done by SNA fighters (the most brutish & undisciplined of the main rebel factions left standing) who had tagged along with HTS, and they were far less involved than HTS in this offensive (since their Turkish master demanded they prioritize fighting the Kurds, that front's also where the footage of them shooting guys in hospital beds & other atrocities came from). This would have encouraged SAA to retreat/surrender/defect to HTS and the Southern Front in much larger numbers than ever before, where even the shittiest conscripts would sack up & fight to the death because they knew JaN (HTS' previous incarnation) or ISIS would brutally kill them anyway even if they did surrender.
He’s not as good as the other general, the Tiger that they had. Don’t remember his name right now.

But clearly he’s got that touch of brutality a strong man leader needs to have, and seemed far more interested and devoted to Syria than Bashar who just let everything slide.

A man like Maher, as well as the troops under his command, also has so much blood on their hands, that they know it’s a life or death fight.
That would be Suhail al-Hassan. He was around for this offensive and did actually fight, but his Tiger Forces (officially renamed the 25th Division) got mauled in fighting around Saraqib before/during Aleppo's fall and although they were able to reorganize after that, they got sent in to try holding a line around Hama and were decisively (buck)broken by HTS there. Videos of rebels driving through their base & checking out captured Tiger equipment, official HTS statements that they had destroyed the Tiger Forces, as well as photos of the Tiger himself with a wounded hand covered in bandages can still be found in the Happenings thread. That's why I keep saying that defeatism and the idea that the Ba'athist government was done for didn't fully set in until after the battle of Hama had concluded, not before - they could have afforded the loss of Aleppo, but Hama was where they suffered truly irreparable losses both to their elite units & their overall morale.

As for Maher, he's reportedly joined his brother in Russia and his troops gave up Damascus to the Southern Front rebels in a day. If it was a life or death fight, well they chose life, just not the way observers (including myself, I was expecting at least a last stand by the 4th Armored around Assad's palace when the battle for the capital began and they were reported to have pulled back into the city) thought they would.
 
Tl;dr I don't think Assad was a defeatist at heart until after December 5 this year
I’m not so sure. We often tend to overlook the human element, and at the end of the day, Assad is a human being like everyone else.

What could be complacency could also be being totally checked out and letting the chips fall as they may, and his cronies do whatever.

It’s notable that Assad’s family was in Moscow even before the events in November. He was never intended as the heir to the throne and never had neither has father’s harsh instincts nor his cunning nature. He became president because the alternative was chaos, and I wouldn’t be surprised if he was just tired and DONE from the civil war in 2018

On top of that he was a devoted family man and his wife suffered from cancer recently.

I’m pretty sure that’s at least part of the reason for his passivity both in rebuilding Syria and in defending the system.

As for the rebel offensive, I think toppling Assad wasn’t the original aim. Erdogan wanted to expand his zone of interest and force Assad to a deal including refugees.

When they saw how easily the SAA gave way, they pushed on. And Erdogan will now likely deal with something he hadn’t expected. A jihadi state on his border and civil war 2.0.

As for Maher, he's reportedly joined his brother in Russia and his troops gave up Damascus to the Southern Front rebels in a day.
Yeah, Maher found out about Bashir fleeing along with everyone else. Had to take a chopper to Iraq and then take a plane from there to Russia.

I’d expect there’s no love lost between the two. Betraying your own brother like this and he has been doing your dirty work for years is a real POS move.

BTW: An interesting podcast on Syria, where they point out that despite HTS doing a fairly decent job at running Idlib, it’s in no way a real army or have an actual organization that could be used as a state apparatus.

In other words; All the local militias are going to try and grab their piece, and Syria is disintegrating.

 
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Anybody who has ever played an FPS or other such team-based game and has tried to galvanize the wastes of skin on your team, that can barely hit the frontside of a barn, to actually PTFO understands the pain that Assad must have went through leading Syria. I pour one out to you buddy and hope all the towelheads saying “Syria is le free now!”, go back home now that there’s not an even a pretense of an excuse for being here now.
 
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