It's an entailment of your claim. There's no way the brain could be "machine-like" other than for it to be something like a computer (in the respects relevant to the critiques given).
my claim is that there's no definitive way to demonstrate that machines are not conscious, that "sentience" is a loaded term and not necessarily a valid way to judge machine intelligence, that the nature of human consciousness and intelligence is not understood, and that you have no effective way of differentiating yourself between any other thing showing signs of consciousness other than your own internally developed heuristic, which is almost certainly incomplete because it's based on incomplete perception of an incomplete data set. I do not argue that the mind is merely a computer, nor do I argue that it is not.
How do you know that "there's no definitive way to demonstrate" it? Have you checked? Later in your post you dismiss philosophy of mind textbooks as "academic", so it seems like you haven't.
all you've demonstrated is that machine intelligence is not like human intelligence in certain ways, at this point in time. you can draw similar contrasts between animal intelligence and human intelligence, and you can also observe that animal intelligence exhibits surprisingly human-like qualities as it gains in complexity. the difference is that animals are not becoming more intelligent, at least in the short term, while machines are becoming rapidly more advanced (at least compared to the pace of evolution). who's to say that even these differences won't disappear with sufficient advancement?
It doesn't look like you've understood the arguments.
The Halting Problem can't be overcome by "more complexity". It's a hard restraint on what algorithms can do. The Chinese Room problem is similarly describing a hard restraint on what objective, in-the-world symbol manipulation systems can do. Thinking a machine can ever understand something is like thinking your pencil understands what you write with it, and it doesn't matter how complex you make the machine behind the pencil.
Animals aren't machines, so bringing them up is irrelevant. I understand that from
your paradigm everything's just matter in motion (and therefore basically machines), but that's what's in question. You're begging the question.
The Mary's Room argument has nothing to do with machines: it's a defeater for materialism in the philosophy of mind in general.
Macroevolution—incidentally—isn't real, either:
the laws of probability render abiogenesis a fundamentally unscientific idea to cling to. in science, you're supposed to reject a result if it falls several standard deviations outside of the mean. Abiogenesis is the opposite: It assumes that the most unlikely thing possible happened, and then throws a bunch of time behind it to justify it.
https://youtube.com/watch?v=MnBBV73KbDohttps://youtube.com/watch?v=mtbJbDwqWLEhttps://youtube.com/watch?v=SMtWvDbfHLoAbiogenesis assumes that these amino acid chains spontaneously generated in such a way that they could self-replicate like this (a process which requires both the RNA strand and a protein, by the way). All viruses and biological life depend on this process. Darwinian evolution never made sense, but it was easier to believe before we knew about intracellular biology.
Don't get me started on "neo-Darwinian theory", either: basically Darwin said that we'd find intermediate forms when the fossil record was more complete; it got more complete, but we never found those intermediate forms (and no, simple structures are not the same as "intermediate forms").
Stephen Jay Gould invented Neo-Darwinian theory to rescue the paradigm: he said that the intermediate forms were on the fringes of populations, because that's where you'd me more likely to see evolutionary pressures. That'd explain why you can't find fossils of them; you only find fossils in population centers.
This is exactly like saying that you "totally have a girlfriend, but she's in Canada—you wouldn't know her, and no you can't see her but trust me bro."
You'd have to be a theistic evolutionist to even entertain the idea.
all these Proper Nouns and thought experiments and textbook citations amount to precisely dick. like I said before, it's all academic, the incompleteness of human perception and knowledge is an intractable problem and there's no way to argue your way around it.
You've failed to show that you've understood the arguments and thought experiments in the first place, so your assertion that there's "no way" doesn't mean much of anything. If you want to be arrogant and intellectually lazy rather than engage with challenges within the field that you're trying to talk about, that's your prerogative—but it's also a good way to make yourself look stupid.
You've also contradicted yourself by saying that knowledge is impossible. Even saying "I can have relative knowledge, but not ultimate knowledge of the truth" is self-refuting: it's a universal, ultimate truth claim about your state of affairs.
Thirdly, from your use of the word "incompleteness" I assume you're referring to Gödel's incompleteness theorems. You've misunderstood those, too. They prove the incompleteness of
formal systems. It doesn't mean that
all knowledge is incomplete: just that whatever axioms lie at the foundation of your formal system are themselves unproveable
formally, through a rational-discursive method. The mistake you're making is in thinking that all knowledge is rational-discursive. Knowledge also comes from intuition and revelation. There are axioms that we intuit/are revealed. It's
noetic. This is something Gödel understood.
Kurt Gödel was a Platonist who
wrote his own ontological argument for God (which I don't personally have an opinion on; transcendental argumentation is way better for this, and it's what's in the "contingency of knowledge" pdf).
