Age Verification Lobby Pushes For Age Verification Checks For VPN Use
Reclaim The Net (archive.ph)
By Cindy Harper
2025-08-15 17:46:25GMT
A trade group representing companies that build age verification systems is now lobbying to extend these checks to anyone using a VPN in the UK. The Age Verification Providers Association (AVPA) wants online platforms that fall under the UK’s censorship law, the Online Safety Act, to not only detect VPN usage but also analyze user behavior to guess whether someone might be a minor in disguise.
If flagged, users would face a prompt: prove your age, or allow a one-time geolocation to confirm you’re outside the UK.
According to the AVPA, this process is necessary because VPNs can mask users’ actual locations, allowing them to appear as though they are in countries where age verification laws do not apply. The association points to data showing a dramatic increase in VPN use around the time the UK’s new internet rules were enforced, suggesting people are using these tools to bypass restrictions.
This approach treats privacy tools as a form of defiance. Here, VPNs, once considered sensible and essential for online security, are being rebranded as suspicious.
Under the new logic, using a VPN could mean you are trying to break the rules. As the UK’s censorship machinery rolls out, AVPA wants to make sure even those trying to shield their data are pulled back into the system.
The justification is familiar: VPNs can hide user locations, letting people appear as though they are accessing the internet from places where the UK’s new rules do not apply. But rather than address the backlash driving VPN usage, AVPA is proposing a dragnet approach that monitors traffic patterns, assigns risk scores based on vague behavioral signals, and then forces users to identify themselves or prove their physical location.
Privacy protections are being reclassified as regulatory gaps. VPNs, proxies, and other location-masking tools are not illegal, but under the current model, platforms are discouraged from even mentioning them. And while Ofcom has stopped short of an outright ban, it has created a climate where using a VPN can make you a target for further scrutiny.
The Online Safety Act does not require platforms to fully block underage access. Instead, it sets a vague standard: services must be “not normally accessible” to minors. In practice, this means companies are expected to close off every possible loophole, and that includes figuring out if VPN users are teenagers trying to bypass restrictions.
AVPA’s proposed process is straightforward and invasive. First, detect VPN traffic using a mix of IP blacklists and traffic analysis. Then, examine the user’s language settings, access times, engagement patterns, and payment behavior to guess whether they are a UK minor. If they match the profile, prompt them: either undergo a facial scan or ID check, or allow the site to geolocate your device once to confirm you are abroad.
They claim this is a privacy-respecting solution, insisting the geolocation check is one-time only, not ongoing. But it still hinges on coercing users into handing over sensitive information just to continue browsing. Users who want to stay anonymous or decline tracking are left with no option but to surrender or be locked out.
Even more troubling is the total lack of accountability when these systems fail. Under the current regime, users can be flagged as underage by an algorithm with no human review. Adults have already been banned from platforms like Discord based on incorrect age predictions, with no path to appeal unless they provide biometric data or official documentation. Once flagged, users are stuck. There is no due process, just an ultimatum.
AVPA argues that VPN detection and behavioral profiling will help platforms stay compliant. But what they are really advocating for is another layer of surveillance. Instead of recognizing that people are using VPNs to escape an overreaching law, they want to penalize that resistance. They are not challenging the logic of the system. They are demanding new tools to enforce it.
The broader context matters. The Online Safety Act is not a child protection measure in any meaningful sense. It is a sweeping control system that treats every user as a potential offender. It mandates identification in exchange for access, transforming the internet from a space of open communication into a series of checkpoints. Your presence online must now be justified.
The recent explosion in VPN usage is the public response to a system that asks for too much and gives back too little. When people are forced to choose between privacy and participation, many are choosing to shield themselves. AVPA’s proposal would punish them for it.
The more surveillance tools are layered into this system, the more users will be pushed out or boxed in. Already, websites are blocking UK users entirely rather than navigate the minefield of compliance. Others are geofencing features or quitting the market altogether. This is the outcome of a policy built on fear, not function.
The push to target VPN users is one more step in a growing pattern. It is not enough for the UK government to require ID scans and facial analysis. Now, even the tools people use to protect themselves from that intrusion are seen as threats. And instead of backing off, groups like AVPA want to go further.
They want platforms to watch for resistance and respond with pressure. They want to turn privacy itself into evidence of guilt. What they are building is not a safer internet. It is a controlled one.
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VPNs are not Kryptonite to age assurance.
The Age Verification Providers Association (archive.ph)
By AVPA Staff
2025-08-09
VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) route a user’s internet traffic through an encrypted tunnel to a server in another location. They protect privacy, secure public Wi-Fi connections and, for many businesses, are essential to remote working. They also allow a user to appear as if they are connecting from a different country, perhaps one where age assurance to protect children online is not a legal requirement. Data shows VPN usage can spike significantly, such as a claimed 1400% surge in sign-ups around enforcement of laws like the UK’s Online Safety Act, as users seek to bypass checks.
For most adults, using a VPN is a legitimate and often advisable way to protect online security (e.g., public Wi-Fi protection). But recent media reports have raised concerns about the effectiveness of age assurance laws such as the UK’s Online Safety Act when VPNs are used to bypass checks. Similar concerns apply to other location-masking tools, including proxies, fake-location apps, virtual machines and remote desktop services.
If VPN use is mostly by adults and very few UK minors succeed in gaining access this way, the digital service can still be compliant. The aim of the law is not to ban VPN use, although Ofcom does wisely restrict sites from promoting it, but to ensure minors in the UK cannot normally reach age-restricted content.
Industry-standard techniques include:
Step 2: Assess likely user profile
Once VPN use is detected, the question becomes whether the user is a UK-based minor or an adult using the VPN for privacy. Behavioural clues can guide this:
For adult content (18+):
Step 3: Prompt for proof
If the behavioural profile suggests a UK-based minor, the service can offer a choice:
Reclaim The Net (archive.ph)
By Cindy Harper
2025-08-15 17:46:25GMT
A trade group representing companies that build age verification systems is now lobbying to extend these checks to anyone using a VPN in the UK. The Age Verification Providers Association (AVPA) wants online platforms that fall under the UK’s censorship law, the Online Safety Act, to not only detect VPN usage but also analyze user behavior to guess whether someone might be a minor in disguise.
If flagged, users would face a prompt: prove your age, or allow a one-time geolocation to confirm you’re outside the UK.
According to the AVPA, this process is necessary because VPNs can mask users’ actual locations, allowing them to appear as though they are in countries where age verification laws do not apply. The association points to data showing a dramatic increase in VPN use around the time the UK’s new internet rules were enforced, suggesting people are using these tools to bypass restrictions.
This approach treats privacy tools as a form of defiance. Here, VPNs, once considered sensible and essential for online security, are being rebranded as suspicious.
Under the new logic, using a VPN could mean you are trying to break the rules. As the UK’s censorship machinery rolls out, AVPA wants to make sure even those trying to shield their data are pulled back into the system.
The justification is familiar: VPNs can hide user locations, letting people appear as though they are accessing the internet from places where the UK’s new rules do not apply. But rather than address the backlash driving VPN usage, AVPA is proposing a dragnet approach that monitors traffic patterns, assigns risk scores based on vague behavioral signals, and then forces users to identify themselves or prove their physical location.
Privacy protections are being reclassified as regulatory gaps. VPNs, proxies, and other location-masking tools are not illegal, but under the current model, platforms are discouraged from even mentioning them. And while Ofcom has stopped short of an outright ban, it has created a climate where using a VPN can make you a target for further scrutiny.
The Online Safety Act does not require platforms to fully block underage access. Instead, it sets a vague standard: services must be “not normally accessible” to minors. In practice, this means companies are expected to close off every possible loophole, and that includes figuring out if VPN users are teenagers trying to bypass restrictions.
AVPA’s proposed process is straightforward and invasive. First, detect VPN traffic using a mix of IP blacklists and traffic analysis. Then, examine the user’s language settings, access times, engagement patterns, and payment behavior to guess whether they are a UK minor. If they match the profile, prompt them: either undergo a facial scan or ID check, or allow the site to geolocate your device once to confirm you are abroad.
They claim this is a privacy-respecting solution, insisting the geolocation check is one-time only, not ongoing. But it still hinges on coercing users into handing over sensitive information just to continue browsing. Users who want to stay anonymous or decline tracking are left with no option but to surrender or be locked out.
Even more troubling is the total lack of accountability when these systems fail. Under the current regime, users can be flagged as underage by an algorithm with no human review. Adults have already been banned from platforms like Discord based on incorrect age predictions, with no path to appeal unless they provide biometric data or official documentation. Once flagged, users are stuck. There is no due process, just an ultimatum.
AVPA argues that VPN detection and behavioral profiling will help platforms stay compliant. But what they are really advocating for is another layer of surveillance. Instead of recognizing that people are using VPNs to escape an overreaching law, they want to penalize that resistance. They are not challenging the logic of the system. They are demanding new tools to enforce it.
The broader context matters. The Online Safety Act is not a child protection measure in any meaningful sense. It is a sweeping control system that treats every user as a potential offender. It mandates identification in exchange for access, transforming the internet from a space of open communication into a series of checkpoints. Your presence online must now be justified.
The recent explosion in VPN usage is the public response to a system that asks for too much and gives back too little. When people are forced to choose between privacy and participation, many are choosing to shield themselves. AVPA’s proposal would punish them for it.
The more surveillance tools are layered into this system, the more users will be pushed out or boxed in. Already, websites are blocking UK users entirely rather than navigate the minefield of compliance. Others are geofencing features or quitting the market altogether. This is the outcome of a policy built on fear, not function.
The push to target VPN users is one more step in a growing pattern. It is not enough for the UK government to require ID scans and facial analysis. Now, even the tools people use to protect themselves from that intrusion are seen as threats. And instead of backing off, groups like AVPA want to go further.
They want platforms to watch for resistance and respond with pressure. They want to turn privacy itself into evidence of guilt. What they are building is not a safer internet. It is a controlled one.
---
VPNs are not Kryptonite to age assurance.
The Age Verification Providers Association (archive.ph)
By AVPA Staff
2025-08-09
VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) route a user’s internet traffic through an encrypted tunnel to a server in another location. They protect privacy, secure public Wi-Fi connections and, for many businesses, are essential to remote working. They also allow a user to appear as if they are connecting from a different country, perhaps one where age assurance to protect children online is not a legal requirement. Data shows VPN usage can spike significantly, such as a claimed 1400% surge in sign-ups around enforcement of laws like the UK’s Online Safety Act, as users seek to bypass checks.
For most adults, using a VPN is a legitimate and often advisable way to protect online security (e.g., public Wi-Fi protection). But recent media reports have raised concerns about the effectiveness of age assurance laws such as the UK’s Online Safety Act when VPNs are used to bypass checks. Similar concerns apply to other location-masking tools, including proxies, fake-location apps, virtual machines and remote desktop services.
The “Not Normally Accessible” Rule
UK law for both adult content and social media with primary priority content does not require absolute prevention of underage access. Instead, it sets a performance standard: the service must be “not normally accessible” to minors. If significant numbers of UK-located children can reach restricted content, the service is out of compliance. There is also a requirement to use “Highly Effective Age Assurance”, such as methods with 95% accuracy thresholds.If VPN use is mostly by adults and very few UK minors succeed in gaining access this way, the digital service can still be compliant. The aim of the law is not to ban VPN use, although Ofcom does wisely restrict sites from promoting it, but to ensure minors in the UK cannot normally reach age-restricted content.
The VPN Fallacy
Some argue that because VPNs exist, any age assurance system will fail. This leads to the mistaken belief that age-restricted sites are exempt from compliance if users connect through a VPN. As we have argued before, this is not true. Legislation we have reviewed globally, including the UK’s Online Safety Act (2023) and similar meaaures in Australia or US states, offers no such exemption. In practice, there are ways to detect and address circumvention and there is no need to even consider banning VPNs outright.Detecting and Responding to VPN Use
Step 1: Detect VPN trafficIndustry-standard techniques include:
- Checking IP addresses against databases of known VPN servers (benchmarked accuracy 95–99% for major providers)
- Analysing patterns of traffic, such as sudden shifts in IP location, repeated connections from the same exit node, or signatures from protocols like OpenVPN or WireGuard
- Identifying mismatches between IP location and other device or browser signals, such as language, currency or time zone settings
Step 2: Assess likely user profile
Once VPN use is detected, the question becomes whether the user is a UK-based minor or an adult using the VPN for privacy. Behavioural clues can guide this:
For adult content (18+):
- Access during UK daytime but not in school hours
- Language set to UK English
- Visiting content popular mainly with UK audiences or younger demographics
- Using free access routes rather than paid subscriptions
- Following or interacting mainly with UK-based peers
- Time zone matching UK usage patterns, considering school hours
- Content engagement typical of younger users
- No payment credentials linked to the account
Step 3: Prompt for proof
If the behavioural profile suggests a UK-based minor, the service can offer a choice:
- Complete a highly effective age assurance check
- Consent to a one-time geolocation to confirm the user is overseas
How Geolocation Works
Modern browsers and apps can request location data from a device using GPS, Wi-Fi network mapping and mobile mast triangulation. The service receives a location estimate precise enough to confirm whether the user is inside or outside the UK, often with 98-99% country-level accuracy. No ongoing tracking is needed, and no location history is stored beyond the verification event. But to do this with enough confidence in the accuracy of the result to achieve legal compliance, it needs user consent. Geolocation is used every time a US gambler places a bet online, to confirm they are in a state where that is legal. While spoofing is possible via extensions or modified devices, it is not ‘normal’ for minors and supports the law’s performance standard. Critically, it’s not IP-based, so VPNs don’t affect it – the location comes from the device itself.Conclusion
VPNs are not the enemy of age assurance. They are valuable privacy and security tools, but can be misused. Digital services using age assurance to remain compliant, can do so by detecting VPN use, assessing risk using behavioural clues, and giving flagged users the option to verify their age or prove their location. This will not detect every underage UK user, but it can ensure age assurance remains highly effective, keeping restricted content “not normally accessible” to minors while respecting the privacy and legitimate VPN use of adults.
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