Soyjak.Party / The Sharty - The altchan born from the ashes of /qa/; also a containment thread

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The Bloody Monday raid (Somali: Isniintii
Dhiiga; Arabic: ﻲﻣاﺪﻟا ﻦﻴﻨﺛﻹا), also known as
the Abdi House raid or Operation Michigan,
was a US military operation[4] that took place
in Mogadishu on 12 July 1993, during the
United Nations Operation in Somalia II
(UNOSOM II) phase of the UN intervention in
the Somali Civil War.[5][6] Carried out by
American QRF troops on behalf of UNOSOM
II, the raid was the war's deadliest incident in
Mogadishu to that point and a turning point in
the UN operation.[7][8] It inflamed anti-UN and
anti-American sentiments among Somalis,
galvanizing the insurgency that the US military
faced during the Battle of Mogadishu three
months later.[9][10][11][8]
As part of the hunt for General Mohammed
Farah Aidid after the attack on Pakistani
peacekeepers on 5 June 1993, U.S. forces
conducted a 17-minute raid on a villa owned by
Aidid's Interior Minister, Abdi "Qeybdiid"
Awale.[12][13][14] The villa was hosting a
gathering attended by high-ranking elders of
the Habar Gidir and other major subclans,
along with prominent members of the Aidid-led
Somali National Alliance (SNA).[15][16][8]
UNOSOM II officials claimed that the
gathering was a war council composed of
hardliners taking place at an SNA command
center, making it a legitimate military
target,[16][17] but never produced evidence to
justify its claims.[18][19][20] In contrast, Somali
accounts of the raid maintain that the meeting
was a peace conference in which eminent
elders, SNA moderates, and civilians convened
to discuss a proposed diplomatic resolution to
the escalating conflict between the SNA and
UNOSOM II.[21][22][8][18]
Casualties UN forces casualties - none
Somali casualties:
UNOSOM II claim - 7 to 20
killed (All male combatants)
Red Cross claim - 215
casualties, including 54 killed
Habar Gidir and SNA claim -
273 casualties, including 73
killed (women and children
among deceased)
Foreign journalists - 4 murdered by
mob after the raid[2][3]
The raid was one of the most pivotal events
during UNOSOM II,[23] as it had a serious
adverse affect on the relationship between
foreign troops and the Somali people, while
alarming numerous UNOSOM troop-
contributing nations, some of which withdrew
from military operations.[10][24] The 12 July
operation was heavily criticized by UNOSOM
II's own Justice Division,[25][12] Doctors
Without Borders,[22] Human Rights Watch,[19]
Amnesty International,[18] and the
Organization of African Unity.[26][23]
The day immediately following the 5 June 1993 attack on Pakistani forces, the UN Security Council
passed Resolution 837, calling for the arrest of those responsible for the death of the peacekeepers.
Though General Mohammed Farah Aidid was not directly named in Resolution 837, his political
organization, the Somali National Alliance was blamed; subsequent investigation concluded that the SNA
was most likely behind the attack.[27]
This marked the beginning of a new phase of escalating tit for tat violence that began with retaliatory AC-
130 strikes on SNA sites and attempts to capture Aidid. These were met with response ambushes, mortar
attacks, and assassinations of Somali UNOSOM II employees by the SNA.[28][5] But UNOSOM efforts to
capture Aidid in the month following the passing of Resolution 837 would repeatedly end in failure.[29]
The planned surprise attack was both unique and historic, in that it was the first attack where the target
would be Somalis instead of weapon caches or other structures and is referred to by Washington Post
reporter Keith B. Richburg as, "the UN's first ever officially authorized assassination".[6][30][31]
Abdi "Qeybdiid" Awale's residence, a villa in the Hodan district of southern Mogadishu, was well known
to have been holding regular clan meetings for the Habar Gidir and became a target, as Qeybdiid was a
high ranking member of the SNA, and the organization was composed in large part of members from the
Habar Gidir.[13][32] In the days and weeks following the commencement of military operations,
UNOSOM had (via radio broadcast and propaganda leaflets dropped over Mogadishu) made the clear
distinction that it was not the enemy of the Habar Gidir clan, but only wanted to capture Aidid.[8]
Following the raid, in late July Under Secretary for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff reiterated in a statement
before a U.S. Senate committee that UNOSOM had no dispute with Habar Gidir and that the clan would
remain in negotiations on political reconciliation.[33]
Detailed planning for a strike on a future gathering at Abdi Qeybdiid Awale's villa began on July 7,
1993.[1] Turkish commander of UNOSOM II forces, General Çevik Bir had privately declared on July 9,
1993, "I will kill Aidid within four days."[34] UNOSOM command considered the planned assault as a
Background
UN planning
US Army officer Major
General Thomas M.
Montgomery, commander of
the 12 July 1993 raid
legitimate defensive action that would weaken Aidid's influence within the Habar Gidir clan. They were
also concerned about the possibility of the Italian contingent secretly negotiating a unilateral agreement
with Aidid, which could inadvertently bolster his popular support.[35]
Unlike in previous raids, Çevik Bir, his deputy US Lieutenant General
Thomas M. Montgomery, and other coalition military leaders decided,
after weeks of agonizing, not to issue any warnings prior to the attack.[6]
The purpose of this was twofold: first it would, in theory, enable them to
fully decapitate the leadership of the SNA; second, it would reduce the
risk of friendly casualties.[13][36][37][14][38] The first reason was
pragmatic in nature and based on past experiences where cordons had
failed and key SNA targets had slipped away.[36] The second reason was
partly pragmatic and partly political. As head of UNOSOM II, retired
US Adm Johnathan Howe could have overruled the military, but chose
not to as heavier casualties sustained from recent firefights, partly due to
the SNA's deliberate use of human shields to test the UN peacekeepers'
rules of engagement, had made the force's commanders wary and
lowered the bar for acceptable risk to civilians during military
operations.[39][37] Sebastian Kaempf, a Senior Lecturer at the University
of Queensland's Political Science department, argued that by not issuing
a warning, UNOSOM II leadership had concluded that military necessity
and the perceived risk of US casualties had overruled concerns for
Somali civilians.[40]
The White House directly signed off on permission for the operation, but it is disputed if President
Clinton knew if Somalis were being directly targeted when he did.[14][41][42] The raid was directed by the
deputy commander of UNOSOM II, Lt. Gen. Montgomery, who was overhead in a helicopter during in
the strike.[43][25]
Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid served as the nominal leader of the Somali National Alliance, but his
ability to make decisions for the organization was limited. A council of elders held decision-making
power for most significant issues, and elections were held that threatened his leadership. The elder
councils moved forward via consensus decision-making after a period of extensive deliberations and
discussion.[44][45]
On July 9, 1993, a handful of prominent Somalis, including Sheikh Haji Mohamed Iman Aden, the most
senior member of the Habar Gidir clan, and former Deputy Prime Minister Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, met
with US Admiral Johnathan Howe, the special representative of the UN Secretary-General in Somalia.
Howe had requested that they search for a peaceful resolution to the ongoing war between the SNA and
UNOSOM II.[8][46][47][45][48] UNOSOM considered Sheikh Haji Mohamed Iman Aden a moderate
alternative to Aidid.[8] Under the mounting pressure of the UNOSOM hunt, six representatives of the
different sub clans within the SNA met and agreed to enter into a political dialogue with UNOSOM on 11
July 1993. At the meeting, headed by Abdiqasim Salad Hassan (later President of Somalia in 2000), a
decision was also made to completely untangle the Habar Gidir clan from politics and leave political
 
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